śrīmacchaṅkarabhagavatpūjyapādaśiṣyaśrītoṭakācāryaviracitam

śrutisārasamuddharaṇam

 

Translators: K S Kannan and H R Meera

Salutations to Hari and Sage Vyāsa
त्रैलोक्यनाथहरिमीड्यमुदारसत्त्वंशक्तेस्तनूजतनयं परमेष्ठिकल्पम्।
जीमूतमुक्तविमलाम्बरचारुवर्णंवासिष्ठमुग्रतपसं प्रणतोऽस्मि नित्यम् ॥ 001 ॥

trailokyanāthaharimīḍyamudārasattvaṁ śaktestanūjatanayaṁ parameṣṭhikalpam ।
jīmūtamuktavimalāmbaracāruvarṇaṁ vāsiṣṭhamugratapasaṁ praṇato'smi nityam ॥ 1 ॥
I bow down always to Hari, the Lord of the three worlds, possessed of enormous strength, and fit to be praised; as too sage Vyāsa (lit: the son of Vasiṣṭha), the grandson (lit: son's son) of Śakti, and who is equal more or less, to Brahmā; and who has a charming hue comparable to the clear sky free of all clouds, and who is fierce in his tapas (austerity).

This verse is in praise of Lord Viṣṇu or Hari, and of Vyāsa.

Hari is the lord of the three worlds. The three worlds are either svarga, martya, and pātāla (the Heavenly, the Mortal, and the Nether worlds) or Bhūḥ, Bhuvaḥ, and Svaḥ (the Earth, the Intermediate World, and the Celestial). Hari is worthy of eulogy. The magnificence of strength of Lord Viṣṇu is well-known. It is He who enveloped the trinity of worlds in three strides.

The third quarter of the verse can be applied to Viṣṇu also, owing to His colour.

Sage Vyāsa is the great grandson of Sage Vasiṣṭha and the grandson of Sage Śakti. He is the son of Parāśara and the father of Śuka - as celebrated in the famous lines prefatory to Viṣṇu-sahasranāman (MBh: vyāsaṁ vasiṣṭhanaptāraṁ śakteḥ pautram akalmaṣam | parāśarātmajaṁ vande śukatātaṁ taponidhim ||).Sage Vyāsa is also known as Kṛṣṇa Dvaipāyana, also because of his dark complexion: his body is described here as having the attractive colour of a cloudless, hence clear, sky. Vyāsa is quite like Lord Brahmā (Parameṣṭhin) Himself.

As a sage he performed rigorous austerities. At a very tender age, in fact, he set out for tapas, and his mother gave him permission on condition that he would appear before her wherever she wished his presence.

The Eligible Aspirant
सकलं मनसा क्रियया जनितंसमवेक्ष्य विनाशितया तु जगत्।
निरविद्यत कश्चिदतो निखिलाद्अविनाशि कृतेन न लभ्यमिति ॥ 002 ॥

sakalaṁ manasā kriyayā janitaṁ samavekṣya vināśitayā tu jagat ।
niravidyata kaścidato nikhilādavināśi kṛtena na labhyamiti ॥ 2 ॥
Observing closely with his own mind that the entire world, born as it is from action(s), is ephemeral, a certain person came to develop dispassion towards everything on grounds that the eternal is unreachable via actions.

The world is full of action. There is so much that we accomplish through action. Apparently nothing is achieved through non-action. At the same time whatever is achieved thus also has an end. Kingdoms have come to ruins. Nothing abides that action accomplishes.The inevitable conclusion, then, is that what is permanent is not one created by action. "Whatever is artificial is impermanent" Cf. yat kṛtakaṁ tad adnityam.

The verse obviously points to what is everlasting viz. the Supreme Brahman. The realisation of the fleeting nature of the world inspires vairāgya, non-attachment. Vairāgya is indeed a prerequisite for the attainment of Brahman.

We acquire things through actions. Acquired things are lost, sooner or later. Loss of what is accomplished with great effort leads to sorrow. The world, thus, is full of sorrow. The mind attaches itself to things that give joy, not sorrow. The mind ceases from clinging to the world and the worldly things, once the realisation dawns that impermanent things cannot inspire permanent happiness.

Rāga is passion; virāga is one who is free of passion; vairāgya is the state or condition of one who is bereft of rāga. Nirveda is another name for vairāgya. nir+√vid is to develop vairāgya. niravidyata = attained nirveda. Vairāgya towards evanescent things inspires enquiry into the ever-abiding principle viz. Brahman.

The verse is but a paraphrase of the Upaniṣadic statement. Says MU 1.2.12 parīkṣya lokān karmacitān brāhmaṇo nirvedamāyāt - nāstyakṛtaḥ kṛtena

Surrendering to the Guru who knows the Self
प्रतिपित्सुरसावविनाशि पदंयतिधर्मरतो यतिमेव गुरुम्।
विदितात्मसतत्त्वमुपेत्य कविंप्रणिपत्य निवेदितवान् स्वमतम् ॥ 003 ॥

pratipitsurasāvavināśi padaṁ yatidharmarato yatimeva gurum ।
viditātmasatattvamupetya kaviṁ praṇipatya niveditavānsvamatam ॥ 3 ॥
Desiring to know the Abode Imperishable, he took to the life of a yati (a mendicant) and resorted to a guru who as a yati, too, and who knew the Ātmic Principle (ātma-tattva), and approaching the guru (the kavi, the knowledgeable one), he prostrated before him and placed before him what he believed himself.

The fourth āśrama viz. that of the yati or the saṁnyāsin is the āśrama totally free of the shackles of worldly life, especially the familial ties that constitute a powerful bond and serve as a bondage to mundane life. It is common to see many wise men established in this fourth āśrama. Those who abide in this āśrama will have already overcome certain pulls. A deep discernment leading to nirveda (same as vairāgya), which in turn inspires yati-dharma (same as saṁnyāsa) are natural steps.

Not all of those who have become yati-s are knowers of the ātman. And so the seeker who has just become a yati ought to go to a yati who has comprehended the ātma-tattva. It is the knower of the self that can become a real guru. In order to know well, one ought to approach such a guru, say the Upaniṣad. MU 1.2.12 tadvijñānārthaṁ sa gurumevābhigacchet.

The word kavi in the verse refers to a knowledgeable person (though it commonly refers to a poet). pratipattum icchuḥ = pratipatsu desirous of knowing. Praṇipatya (prostrating) is easily reminiscent of the BG verse 4.34 tadviddhi praṇipātena paripraśnena sevayā.

Avināśi (indestructible) is reminiscent of BG 2.17 avināśi tu tad viddhi yena sarvamidaṁ tatam.

The Disciple’s Request
भगवन्नुदधौ मृतिजन्मजलेसुखदुःखझषे पतितं व्यथितम्।
कृपया शरणागतमुद्धर माम्अनुशाध्युपसन्नमनन्यगतिम् ॥ 004 ॥

bhagavannudadhau mṛtijanmajale sukhaduḥkhajhaṣe patitaṁ vyathitam ।
kṛpayā śaraṇāgatamuddhara māmanuśādhyu.upasannamananyagatim ॥ 4 ॥
"Revered Sir, I am fallen into the ocean [of saṁsāra] - which has birth and death as its waters, and joys and sorrows as the crocodiles - and am hence aggrieved; I take refuge in you; kindly lift me [from this ocean]; I have no other way to go’ Please instruct me as I approach you as a disciple".

Even Vedāntic works in Sanskrit often have poetic touches. Saṁsāra is the cycle of births and deaths. It is very commonly portrayed as an ocean. Cf. saṁsārasāgaraṁ ghoram anantakleśabhājanam. Births and deaths constitute the waters of this ocean. Joys and sorrows continually assail us often/commonly, leaving no respite for us to dwell on deeper issues of life.

The way out of the saṁsāra is nothing easy either. Complete surrender to the knowing guru is alone the solution. Cf. BG 2.7 śiṣyaste’haṁ śādhi māṁ tvāṁ prapannam. Also Cf. Vivekacūḍāmaṇi 37 tīrṇāḥ svayaṁ bhīmabhavārṇavaṁ janān ahetunānyānapi tārayantaḥ. It is he who has crossed this ocean himself that can help others who wish to cross. Śādhi of the BG and anuśādhi here have the same sense; prapannam of the BG and upasannam also have the same sense.

Shedding the Delusion about the body and the world
विनिवर्त्य रतिं विषये विषमांपरिमुच्य शरीरनिबद्धमतिम्।
परमात्मपदे भव नित्यरतोजहि मोहमयं भ्रममात्ममतेः ॥ 005 ॥

vinivartya ratiṁ viṣaye viṣamāṁ parimucya śarīranibaddhamatim ।
paramātmapade bhava nityarato jahi mohamayaṁ bhramamātmamateḥ ॥ 5 ॥
Turn your flawy fondness away from the objects [of sense organs]; abandon the sense of I-ness in the body; be engaged always in the contemplation of Paramātman (the Supreme Self). Shed the delusion of infatuation of identification of the body with the self.

The strong sense of identification of the body with the self, and the strong attraction towards worldly objects of pleasure engender each other. The two must first be forsaken so as to be able to abide in Paramātman.

The true aham
विसृजान्नमयदिषु पञ्चसु ताम्अहमस्मि ममेति मतिं सततम्।
दृशिरूपमनन्तमृतं विगुणंहृदयस्थम् अवेहि सदाहमिति ॥ 006 ॥

visṛjānnamāyādiṣu pañcasu tāmahamasmi mameti matiṁ satatam ।
dṛśirūpamanantamṛtaṁ viguṇaṁ hṛdayasthamavehi sadā'hamiti ॥ 6 ॥
Always forsake the feeling of 'I' and 'mine' in the five (kośa-s) viz. annamaya-kośa and others. [On the other hand,] realise all the time that the seer who abides in the heart - infinite, immortal, true and bereft of guṇa-s - is the self.

Kośa-s, sheaths, are five in number. They are called annamayakośa (sheath constituted by the body), prāṇamayakośa (sheath of the prāṇa-s), manomayakośa (sheath constituted by the mind), vijñānamayakośa (sheath constituted by the intellect) and ānandamayakośa (sheath constituted of bliss).

We often tend to identify the content with the vestment, the core with the vesture. Kośa-s are covers for the Ātman, one upon the other. The annamayakośa is the grossest and the outermost and the remaining four go subtler and deeper, one encased in the other - the previous situated in the next.

What enshrines the self is not the self. Hence the advice not to identify the self with any of the five sheaths.

I and mine can sometimes coalesce. The coalescence is seen the more in linguistic usage. "This is I" we say pointing to our body, and we also speak of "my body". The feelings of I and mine can thus alternate with the mind and the intellect also.

These pairs of senses - of I and mine - are to be eschewed with respect to any of the five kośa-s - says this verse.

The true self is different. Situated in the heart, the Self constitutes the seer. The Infinite Seer is immortal, and not made of guṇa-s. The guṇa-s are three in number - viz. sattva, rajas, and tamas. The Ātman is beyond the guṇa-s. It is with this Ātman that one must identify oneself with.

Multiplicity issues from buddhi
जलभेदकृता बहुतेव रवेर्घटिकादिकृता नभसोऽपि यथा।
मतिभेदकृता तु तथा बहुतातव बुद्धिदृशोऽविकृतस्य सदा ॥ 007 ॥

jalabhedakṛtā bahuteva raverghaṭikādikṛtā nabhaso'pi yathā ।
matibhedakṛtā tu tathā bahutā tava buddhidṛśo'vikṛtasya sadā ॥ 7 ॥
Like the multiplicity of the Sun owing to [receptacles of] water being different, and again, like the multiplicity of the sky owing to the [very many] pots - so is the multiplicity owing to the differences in intellect of the Self, which is the very witness to the intellect, and which is never subject to any modification.

The ātman is the witness to the self, and is unitary. However we perceive a multiplicity of ātman-s. And this is nothing but a consequence of the mediating adjuncts. The unity of the ātman is grasped once the adjuncts are done away with.

Two illustrations are offered for the same. There is but one Sun [in our solar system; there could be many more as per the research of scientists, but the analogy pertains to what we know by our own experience]. Common experience provides adequate examples.

Where there are several ponds, several Suns can be seen owing to the reflection in these different water bodies. The reflection of the Sun in several vessels of water is also similar. Nevertheless, the Sun is but one.

So it is with space. We can speak of the space contained in different pots. The more the number of pots, the more the space-units. But space as such has no divisions. Space is essentially divisionless. The adjuncts viz. the various pots show us different units of space. The adjuncts called the water-bodies acted the role of reflectors of sunlight, and hence the perception of 'multiple Suns".

The Ātman is but one, and the one is perceived as the many. Cf. BBU 12 : ekadhā bahudhā caiva dṛśyate jalacandravat.

Cit illumines Citta
दिनकृत्प्रभया सदृशेन सदाजनचित्तगतं सकलं स्वचिता।
विदितं भवताविकृतेन सदायत एमतोऽसित एव सदा ॥ 008 ॥

dinakṛtprabhayā sadṛśena sadā janacittara (ccari)taṁ sakalaṁ svacitā ।
viditaṁ bhavatā'vikṛtena sadā yata evamato'sita eva sadā ॥ 8 ॥
You are like the splendour of the Sun, ever unmodified. And so you are never fettered. As with the solar light, so with the consciousness of your self, everything pertaining to the mind is perceived by you.

Sva, the self, is like the Sun (dinakṛt) and one's own consciousness (sva-cit) is like the splendour (prabhā) of the Sun. It is this consciousness that enables one to know what is elsewhere. You are undergoing no changes at all. By you, undergoing no mutation (avikṛtena bhavatā) is all this (undergoing constant change) witnessed. Sita is from √ṣi, to bind. and means what is bound, fettered. asita = not fettered.

Note the emphasis provided by three sadā-s. You are immutable as you never got into any bondages first of all.

Mind tinged by objects
उपरागमुपेत्य मतिर्विषयैर्विषयावधृतं कुरुते तु यतः।
तत एव मतेर्विदिताविदिताविषयास्तु, ततः परिणामवती ॥ 009 ॥

uparāgamapekṣya matirviṣaye viṣayāvadhṛtiṁ kurute tu yataḥ ।
tata eva materviditāviditā viṣayāstu tataḥ pariṇāmavatī ॥ 9 ॥
It is when it is tinged by the objects [of senses] that the mind grasps those objects. It is for the very reason that the objects get to be known by the mind or not get to be known - which itself shows that the mind undergoes changes.

What does it mean when you say you perceive a pot? Through the sense organs, the mind comes in contact with the objects of the senses. Uparāga is being eclipsed and enveloped, coloured and tinged. As a matter of fact, when the mind gets the uparāga with the viṣaya-s, it gets "enveloped" by the object, or rather, "assumes the shape of the object".

We also know that we perceive objects sometimes, and not at other times. The same object, quite present there, is now perceived, now not perceived. The change is not in the object - which just continues to be present; but rather in the mind which now grasps it and not again. In other words, while there is no change in the object, the change is in the mind alone. The mind thus undergoes changes.

Ātma-cit changeless
मतिवृत्तय आत्मचिता विदिताःसततं हि यतोऽविकृतस्तु ततः।
यदि चात्मचितिः परिणामवतीमतयो विदिताविदिताः स्युरिमाः ॥ 010 ॥

mativṛttaya ātmacitā viditāḥ satataṁ hi yato'vikṛtaśca tataḥ ।
yadi cā''tmacitiḥ pariṇāmavatī matayo viditāviditāḥ syurimāḥ ॥ 10 ॥
The Ātmic consciousness is always aware of the mental modes (vṛtti-s). For this very reason, the Ātman is free from modification. Had it been the case that the Ātmic consciousness would be undergoing changes, even these mental modes could have been now known, now unknown.

What is abiding and unchanging can be a witness to what is undergoing changes. The mind is going through modifications. This is evidenced by the fact that things that have remained unchanged (e.g., the pot) are sometimes noticed and sometimes unnoticed.

Had the mind been free of all modifications, the pot would have been perceived all the time. If the pot is perceived only now and then though it continues to be there, it only proves the modifications the mind is through.

While the pot is "in front of'' the mind, the Ātmic awareness is "behind" the mind. For, the Ātmic consciousness is continuously aware of the modifications in the mind. There is no moment when the mental modification is not known to the Ātman. This establishes that the Ātman remains immutable whereas the mind is through various modifications. The Ātman is the witness.

Had it been the case, on the other hand, that the Ātman is also undergoing changes, the mental modifications would have been known only now and then, not always. The absence of this proves that Ātman is changeless and abiding.

Mental Modes not in the Self
चरितं तु धियः सकलं सततंविदितं भवता परिशुद्धचिता।
मतिभेदगुणो न हि तेऽस्ति ततोयत एवमतोऽसदृशस्तु धिया ॥ 011 ॥

caritaṁ tu dhiyaḥ sakalaṁ satataṁ viditaṁ bhavatā pariśuddhācitā ।
matibhedaguṇo nahi te'sti tato yata evamato'sadṛśastu dhiyā ॥ 11 ॥
The Pure Awareness that you are, you are aware continuously of the mental modifications. And for this very reason, the features issuing from varying mental modes are not to be seen in yourself. Therefore, you are in no wise the same as the mind.

It was the mind that saw the pot - hence the mind was the seer with the pot in front, the mind is the seer, and the pot the seen. While watching the mental modes, the Ātman is the witness and the objects viewed are the mental modifications. The mind is thus the seen, and the Ātmic consciousness is the seer. While the mind undergoes so many changes, the self does not. The mind is now like this, and now like that, but the Ātmic consciousness is abiding and unitary. The mind is the object seen, undergoing modifications and is multiple. The Ātman is the opposite of these.

Mind illumined by another
विदितत्वमविप्रतिपन्नतयामतिषु प्रगतं विषयेषु यथा।
यत एवमतः परसंविदिताविदितत्वत एव यथा विषयाः ॥ 012 ॥

viditatvamavipratipannatayā matiṣu pragataṁ viṣayeṣu yathā ।
yata evamataḥ parasaṁviditā viditatvata eva yathā viṣayāḥ ॥ 12 ॥
It is settled without any contradiction that the mental modes get perceived, even as the various objects also get perceived. For this reason, the mind is what is illumined by another, quite like the objects which too are objects of perception.

The external objects are objects of perception. None doubts that they are perceivable. On par exactly with the external objects are mental modes. Whatever is perceived is not self-illumined. Going by this logic, the intellect too is a perceivable object, hence not self-luminous.

Vipratipatti is an opposite view. Vipratipanna is one who has a contrary view. A-vipratipannatayā means uncontestedly, incontestably. Viditatva, being known, is the same as jñātatva.

The purpose of the previous verse and this verse is to show that buddhi is not self-luminous. It is only when light is shed on it, that it becomes visible. If a thing is visible, then it is clear that the thing became visible because someone willed to take a look at it.

What applies to the object applies to the mind too. The Ātman is the witness and the intellect is, too, an object to be looked at.

The mind does not know itself
परसंविदिताः सततं हि यतोन विदुः स्वममी विषयास्तु ततः।
मतयोऽपि तथा परसंविदिताःन विदुः स्वममूर्विषयास्तु यथा ॥ 013 ॥

parasaṁviditāḥ satataṁ hi yato na viduḥ svamamī viṣayāstu tataḥ ।
matayo'pi tathā parasaṁviditā na viduḥ svamamūrviṣayāstu yathā ॥ 13 ॥
These objects of the senses are always cognized by others; they do not cognize themselves. Even so are our minds: they are cognized by others but do not cognize themselves.

The faculties are, apparently, a part of the cognizer. This often makes us ignore the fact that they too lack self-awareness. This is to say that they cannot become aware, all by themselves, of things outside of them. On quite the other hand, they share the feature of the objects cognized. The objects are taken note of by others, and are unable to cognize things on their own. They lack self-awareness.

Exactly the same is the situation with the inner faculties. While we commonly say the mind (or the intellect) cognizes the object, it is not actually the mind or the intellect that is able to cognize. The mind/the intellect can itself be cognized. So then, they are on par with the objects of the sense-organs.

The dual engagement of the mind
विषयाकृतिसंस्थितिरेकविधामनसस्तु सदा व्यवहारविधौ।
अहमित्यपि तद्विषया त्वपरामतिवृत्तिरवज्वलितात्मचिता ॥ 014 ॥

viṣayākṛtisaṁsthitirekavidhā manasastu sadā vyavahāravidhau ।
ahamityapi tadviṣayā tvaparā mativṛttiravajvalitā''tmacitā ॥ 14 ॥
One type of arrangement of the mind is in the context of all worldly transactions, where it assumes the shape of the object. The other is of the shape of the "I", where the mental faculty is inflamed by the vitality of the Ātman.

The mental faculty is somewhat Janus-faced. It acts as an interface between the seer and the seen. While it comes as a part of the cognizer, it shares a feature with the object perceived.

In the act of cognition, the faculty assumes the shape of the object cognized; at the same time it identifies itself with the seer and impersonates the seer as it were. The ahaṅkāra, literally means the sound of "aham" in inverted commas. The true seer is the self, but the mind acts on behalf of the self, and the vitality for this action issues from the self - ātmacit, that is. Cit is the same as caitanya.

Thus the mind assumes a dual role viz. viṣayākāra and ahaṅkāra: the shape of the object perceived and the shape of the perceiving seer. It is this versatile role of the mind that gives it a special position, power, and function - as the subjective and as the objective simultaneously.

It is not the Ātman who styles himself "aham". "Aham'' pertains to the mind, not the self.

The lay take the mind to be the self
पुरुषस्य तु धर्मवदुद्भवतिस्वरसेन मतेः स्वगुणोऽपि यतः।
अत आत्मगुणं प्रतियन्ति जनाःमतिवृत्तिमिमामहमित्यबुधाः ॥ 015 ॥

puruṣasya tu dharmavadudbhavati svarasena mateḥ svamuṇo'pi satī ।
ata ātmaguṇaṁ pratiyanti janā mativṛttimimāmahamityabudhāḥ ॥ 15 ॥
What is naturally the very own feature of the mind, arises as it were as that of the puruṣa, the being. It is for this reason that people deem this mental faculty as the very self.

Matiguṇa or the feature of the mind puts on an appearance of puruṣa-dharma, the feature of the being. Ordinary people cannot note the difference between the two. As a consequence of this, ātma-guṇa is taken as mativṛtti mental faculty. The words dharma, guṇa and vṛtti are used almost synonymously here.

'Aham' (I) in its true sense should refer to the Ātman. But people, in their ignorance, equate it with the mental faculty. Abudha-jana refers to the ordinary folk who are unenlightened. aham iti pratiyanti = believe [it] to be "I".

There is thus a superimposition. What pertains to, and is limited to, the buddhi is felt as pertaining to the self. The buddhi-features are perceived as the ātman-features. The buddhi is anātman, and thus there is a mixing up of the ātma and the anātman.

Delusion, the foundation of vyavahāra
यदि सा न भवेज्जनमोहकरीव्यवहारमिमं न जनोऽनुभवेत्।
विफलश्च सदा विषयानुभवोज्ञगुणो न हि सेति यदा विदिता ॥ 016 ॥

yadi sā na bhavejjanamohakarī vyavahāramimaṁ na jano'nubhavet ।
viphalaśca tadā viṣayānubhavo jñaguṇo nahi seti yadā viditā ॥ 16 ॥
Had it not been for this deluding factor, none would have had any worldly transaction. That would have forever nullified the experience of the objects, had it been known that the feature of the mind is no feature of the knower (viz. the Ātman).

All the time we see people dealing with the objects of the senses. This is vyavahāra. This handling of the objects subsumes the feelings of I and mine: I do this and I get this; or I do this because I want to get this.

If on the other hand, had it been clearly perceived that doership and enjoyership pertain to the mind and not to the Ātman, people would have never indulged in the worldly transaction.

Jña is the Ātman, the conscient. Jñaguṇa is the feature of the Ātman.

Though untrue, the mental faculty mesmerises all. We come to associate with what is not indeed ours. The moment we realise this superimposition, worldly transactions cease. The recognition of the true "I" negates the imposter I.

Mind and multiplicity
उपलभ्यघटादिनिभैव भवेत्मनसो यदि संस्थितिरेकविधा।
पुरुषस्य चितिश्च न विक्रियतेमतिवृत्तिमपेक्ष्य घटादिनिभाम् ॥ 017 ॥

upalabhyaghaṭādinibhaiva bhavenmanaso yadi saṁsthitirekavidhā ।
puruṣasya citiśca na vikriyate mativṛttimapekṣya ghaṭādinibhām ॥ 17 ॥
Had it been the case that the mind had [but] one function, it could then assume the shape of the pot etc alone that it encounters; [given that] the caitanya of the puruṣa undergoes no change [whatsoever] as against the function of the mind which does [undergoes change] such as of the pot.

It has already been noted that a pot gets to be known when the "mind-fluid" takes on that shape - of the thing it encounters such as a pot. Had it been the case that this alone could be the mode it can assume, we encounter a difficulty. For it is clear, after all, that the citi of the puruṣa, the essence of the knower, undergoes no change comparable. In other words, the puruṣa has no vṛtti, like that of the mind, such as can assume the shape of the object encountered.

Upalabhyāghaṭādi-nibhā is a single word; it is not correct to split it and take upalabhya as a separate word, ending in lyap. upalabhya-ghaṭa means the ghaṭa encountered. Upalabhya literally means "fit to be encountered". It refers thus to any object one may come across; "all things one may get to perceive"; the perceivable object.

The genesis of vyavahāra
अवगन्त्रवगम्यचिदात्मधियो-रहमित्यभिमानविहीनतया।
स्थितयोरभिमानपुरःसरकंव्यवहारपथं न जनोऽवतरेत् ॥ 018 ॥

avagantravagamyacidātmadhiyorahamityabhimānavihīnatayā ।
sthitayorabhimānapuraḥsarakaṁ vyavahārapathaṁ na jano'vataret ॥ 18 ॥
No man would embark upon any worldly transaction with the [usual] sense of “me” and “my [interests]”, owing to the absence of - the feeling of mine in each of the mental faculties as the seen, and of the sentient self as the knower.

Ava+√gam is 'to know'. The words avagantṛ and avagamya are derived from the said root. The former means the knower, and the latter means what is to be known. The two words are usually applied to the individual self and the objects in the world respectively.

In the context of the discussion in the text, the faculty viz. the intellect, is itself being looked upon as a thing to be known. So the avagantṛ is the same viz. the individual self, and the avagamya is the intellect. The former is the cidātman, the sentient self and the latter is dhī, the intellect or the mental faculty.

The issue being discussed is the basis of the worldly transactions. I and mine are at the basis of all transactions. The question that is being raised and discussed is as regards the locus of this basis. If neither of the two can be the locus, none can involve oneself in any worldly transaction.

Urging the senses towards objects
अहमीक्ष इति प्रथमं हि धियासुविचिन्त्य ततो विषयाभिमुखम्।
नयनं प्रहिणोति तथान्यदपिश्रवणादि वियत्प्रमुखस्य गुणे ॥ 019 ॥

ahamīkṣa iti prathamaṁ hi dhiyā suvicintya tato viṣayābhimukham ।
nayanaṁ prahiṇoti tathā'nyadapi śravaṇādi viyatpramukhasya guṇe ॥ 19 ॥
It is only after deliberating well with his intellect first [thus]: “I will take a look”, that one directs his vision [towards its object]; and so it is with others - the ear etc, towards their objects viz. sound etc.

Deliberation precedes action. The action is in the form of impelling the eye to see the visible object. This only follows premeditation: the thought "I see [now]" is followed by the action of seeing.

What applies to the eye applies to the other organs. The other organs are the ear and the others. Their objects are the sound etc. Just as the eye grasps forms, the ear grasps sounds. So it is with the nose, the tongue, and the skin - regarding smell, taste, and touch.

The sight of five sense-organs have their corresponding set of five objects of sense. It must also be noted that these very five objects viz the form, the sound, the smell, the taste, and touch - respectively constitute the properties of the five bhūta-s (or the "Elements") viz. the tejas ("Fire"), ākāśa ("Ether") pṛthvī ("Eaarth"), ap ("Water"), and vāyu ("Wind'). In particular, ākāśa is also known by the name 'viyat', its synonym. Thus, śabda is the guṇa (ākāśa or) viyat.

It may also be noted that we have here an indication of the correspondences between three pentads viz. the 5 sense organs(C), the 5 sense objects(B), and the 5 "Elements"(A). They can be tabulated thus.

A B Cākāśa śabda earvāyu sparśa skintejas rūpa eyeap rasa tonguepṛthvī gandha nose

Ahaṅkāra at the root of vyavahāra
अपहाय न कश्चिदहङ्करणंव्यवहारमुपैति कदाचिदपि।
उपपन्नतरा हि मतेस्तु ततोव्यवहारपथं प्रति कारणता ॥ 020 ॥

apahāya na kaścidahaṅkaraṇaṁ vyavahāramupaiti kadācidapi ।
upapannatarā hi matestu tato vyavahārapathaṁ prati kāraṇatā ॥ 20 ॥
None ever involves himself in any transaction relinquishing his "I"-ness. Consequently, the involvement of the mind in transactions is only more plausible.

There is no worldly business without the involvement of the "I". All worldly transactions involve the sense organs, and if the mental faculty is absent for any reason, the transaction does not get through at all. I-ness is at the root of all worldly affairs. Hence the I-feeling is easily, clearly, and plausibly postulated as causal to all worldly transactions.

I-ness belongs to mind or self?
चितिशक्तिगुणः किमहङ्करणंकिमु बुद्धिगुणोऽथ भवेदुभयोः।
इति चिन्त्यमिदं मनसानलसैःउपपत्तिभिरात्महितं यतिभिः ॥ 021 ॥

citiśaktiguṇaḥ kimahaṅkaraṇaṁ kimu buddhiguṇo'tha bhavedubhayoḥ ।
iti cintyamidaṁ manasā'nalasairupapattibhirātmahitaṁ yatibhiḥ ॥ 21 ॥
Is the I-ness a property of the Ātman? Or is it a feature of the mind? Or of both? Shedding laziness, earnest seekers ought to examine this question through proper logic as it is in the interest of one's own self.

The one key question that needs to be resolved at the outset is whether the I-ness pertains to the ātman or to the buddhi; to the self or to the mental faculty. A third possibility can also be there which should not be excluded viz. whether it pertains to both. This question should not be ignored as it pertains to ātmahita, the true interests of the self - which is to say it is nothing of superficial interest or value.

This also calls upon the inquirer to be on the alert here. One finds oneself at a dead end soon while enquiring into such questions. Mental lethargy takes over inspiring him to shelve this aside as an imponderable. Shedding inertia, one must take this question up in right earnest.

The word yatibhiḥ is derivable from yati and yatin - which may mean “one who exerts himself zealously (√yat)”, or “one who exercises great control over oneself (√yam)”. In either case one must spare no efforts in looking into this question. One will also have to invoke the various analytical approaches for handling this.

Guṇa or avayava?
उपलभ्यमहङ्करणं न भवेत्पुरुषस्य गुणो यदि तर्हि भवेत्।
गुणिरूपमथावयवं गुणिनोन विहाय गुणः पृथगस्ति यतः ॥ 022 ॥

upalabhyamahaṅkaraṇaṁ na bhavetpuruṣasya guṇo yadi tarhi bhavet ।
guṇirūpamatho'vayayaṁ guṇino na vihāya guṇaḥ pṛthagasti yataḥ ॥ 22 ॥
Had it been the case that the ahaṅkaraṇa (I-ness) is a guṇa (attribute) of the ātman, it would become the very ātman itself [which is to say the very] thing that has the guṇin (attribute). Had it, on the other hand, been a limb of ātman, that cannot be possible; for, never does a guṇa(attribute) exist apart from the guṇin (thing).

When we investigate the relationship between that ātman and the ahaṅkāra, there can be two possibilities: (a) ahaṅkāra is a guṇa of the ātman, (b) ahaṅkāra is an avayava (limb) of the ātman.

Had it been the guṇa, then it would in no wise be different from the ātman which is the guṇin. The guṇa and the guṇin are essentially the same, or at least no essentially different. This leads to a logical difficulty. The guṇin cannot perceive the guṇa. For, the observer and the observed cannot be the same. The observer cannot himself be the observed. Or even more logically, the observed cannot be the observer. Ahaṅkāra is the observed, and so cannot be the observer. The first possibility is thus ruled out. The second case also presents some difficulties. Had ahaṅkāra been an avayava of the ātman, then it should have been separable from the ātman. This is because the avayava and the avayavin are separable items. But ahaṅkāra is never seen as separate from (or as separable from) the ātman (which is the avayavin).

Guṇa and guṇin
न गुणो गुणिनि स्थितवान् गुणिनाविषयीक्रियते न च तस्य गुणैः।
न हि देशकृता न च वस्तुकृतागुणिनोऽस्ति गुणस्य भिदा तु यतः ॥ 023 ॥

na guṇo guṇini sthitavān guṇinā viṣayī kriyate na ca tasya guṇaiḥ ।
nahi deśakṛtā na ca vastukṛtā guṇino'sti guṇasya bhidā tu yataḥ ॥ 23 ॥
The guṇa present in a guṇin cannot get to be an object of the guṇin; nor can it be an object for the other guṇa-s of the guṇin. For, there can be no difference, either spatially or substantially, of the guṇa from the guṇin.

The guṇin cannot happen to observe the guṇa residing in itself (i.e. in the guṇin). A selfsame guṇin may have multiple guṇa-s; and one guṇa therein cannot observe another guṇa either.

If guṇin and the guṇa are different, on what counts can they differ? In other words, on what counts do things which are different differ? Two or three counts are usually recognized: space and content (and even time) - deśa-kṛtā bhidā and vastu-kṛtā bhidā as they are respectively called.

Now neither of such differences can be postulated between the guṇin and the guṇa. But such is not the case between the ātman and ahaṅkāra. In other words, ahaṅkāra cannot be conceived of as a guṇa of the ātman. And that is because ahaṅkāra can become a viṣaya, object, of the ātman.

Guṇatva and Viṣayatva
न परस्परमग्निगुणोऽग्निगतोविषयत्वमुपैति कदाचिदपि।
न हि वह्निरपि स्वगुणं स्वगतंविषयीकुरुते स्वगुणेन भुवि ॥ 024 ॥

na parasparamagniguṇo'gnigato viṣayatvamupaiti kadācidapi ।
nahi bahnirapi svaguṇaṁ svagataṁ viṣayī kurute svaguṇena bhuvi ॥ 24 ॥
The guṇa-s in fire(agni) can never mutually become the viṣaya-s (objects) of one another. And again, agni does not have as its viṣaya, object, any guṇa of its own.

This verse rules out two possibilities - (a) of the various guṇa-s of agni ever making themselves the object of one another; and (b) of agni itself making any of its own guṇa-s an object of itself.

Agni has several guṇa-s or attributes: e.g. brightness, heat, temperature etc. The brightness of agni does not have as its object, agni’s heat. No two guṇa-s can come to possess one another as their object. This is the first one. And the second one is of agni having as its own object, any of its own guṇa-s.

All these go to show that agni and its guṇa-s are no parallel for ātman and ahaṅkāra. Ātman can have, contrastingly, the ahaṅkāra as its viṣaya, object. The two are thus utterly different. Thus, ahaṅkāra is not to be construed as an ātmaguṇa/ātmadharma.

Kaṇāda refuted
कणभुग् यमचीक्लृपदात्मगुणंगुणपूगमनित्यमनात्मगुणम्।
अनयैव दिशा स निराक्रियतांनहि नित्यमनित्यगुणेन गुणि ॥ 025 ॥

kaṇabhugyamacīklṛpadātmaguṇaṁ guṇapūgamanityamanātmaguṇam ।
anayaiva diśā sa nirākriyatāṁ nahi nityamanityaguṇena guṇi ॥ 25 ॥
What host of guṇa-s Kaṇāda has designated as ātma-guṇa-s are all anātma-guṇa-s and are ephemeral. By the same logic has that to be refuted too. After all, an eternal entity cannot have an impermanent feature as its guṇa.

Kaṇāda has established the Vaiśeṣika School. He has designated joy and sorrow (sukha and duḥkha) etc as ātmaguṇā-s. But these impermanent features are shown as the features of something, that something also becomes impermanent. So then if sukha and duḥkha are ātmaguṇa-s, ātman himself becomes anitya, as sukha and duḥkha are impermanent. Ātman cannot be called impermanent. Hence they are not ātmaguṇa-s.

Ākāśa as anitya
वियतः प्रभवं प्रवदन्ति यतःश्रुतयो बहुशः खमनित्यमतः।
उपमानमनित्यगुणं वियतोन हि नित्यमिहास्ति कणादमते ॥ 026 ॥

viyataḥ prabhavaṁ pravadanti yataḥ śrutayo bahuśaḥ khamanityamataḥ ।
upamānamanityaguṇaṁ viyato nahi nityamihāsti kaṇādakṛte ॥ 26 ॥
Many Vedic statements speak of the origin of ākāśa. Hence ākāśa is impermanent. And therefore, the analogy viz. "ākāśa which is permanent, has an impermanent guṇa (viz. śabda) is no apposite analogy. There is in the view of Kaṇāda, nothing permanent.

In the School of Kaṇāda, ākāśa is nitya, permanent. But this goes contrary to śruti, the Veda-s. There are several sentences in the Veda-s which speak of the origin of ākāśa. Ākāśa, therefore is anitya, impermanent. Whatever has a moment of origin/birth is bound to be impermanent.

The counterargument, therefore, that something which is permanent has features which are impermanent - that a nitya thing has anitya attributes - is thus ruled out. Therefore what was sought to be presented as an analogy is shown to have no proper foundation.

No yoga, no viyoga
मनसा पुरुषः पुरुषेण मनोनभसा मुसलं मुसलेन नभः।
न हि योगवियोगमुपैति कुतोऽ-वयवित्वनिराकरणादमुतः ॥ 027 ॥

manasā puruṣaḥ puruṣeṇa mano nabhasā musalaṁ musalena nabhaḥ ।
nahi yogaviyogamupaiti kuto'vayavitvanirākaraṇādamutaḥ ॥ 27 ॥
Neither has manas (mind) yoga or viyoga, union or separation, with the ātman; nor ātman with manas. And the same is the case - of the union or separation of the sky with the pestle, or of the pestle with the sky. And the reason for the same is that neither of the two viz. the ākāśa and the ātman are said to have no avayava-s (limbs).

There is a discussion here of two items - puruṣa and nabhas, the self and the ether. Both are described as vibhu (all-pervading) in the Vaiśeṣika system. What is all-pervading can be said to have no parts (avayava-s). And whatever has no avayava can have no saṁyoga or viyoga (conjunction or disjunction) with another thing.

As the ātman is anavayavin (having no parts), there can be no question of its saṁyoga with manas. This goes exactly contrary, it must be noted, with the Vaiśeṣika dictum that pratyakṣa (or perception) takes place when ātman gets associated first with manas (which in turn gets associated with indriya, the sense organ, and this latter with the object of the sense). It is being denied here that ātman and manas can have saṁyoga at all.

From the known to the unknown
इह रज्जुघटादि हि सावयवंसमुपैति युजामितरेतरतः।
इति दृष्टमतोऽन्यददृष्टमपिस्वयमूह्यमिदं न परित्यजता ॥ 028 ॥

iha rajjughaṭādi hi sāvayavaṁ samupaiti yujāmitaretarataḥ ।
iti dṛṣṭamato'nyadadṛṣṭamapi svayamūhyamidaṁ tvaparityajatā ॥ 28 ॥
Things like the rope and the pot have parts. That is why they can come together and join, and this is evident. What is not very evident must also thereby be inferred - by not shelving aside the logic here.

We always go from the known to the unknown, from what is very evident to what is not so evident (from dṛṣṭa to adṛṣṭa). This will be possible when one holds on to the proper logic - by observing the pattern in things visible, and extending it to things invisible.

What we see in the world is the coming together of the pot and the rope - as in the common instance of drawing water from the well. The question to be studied here is why and how these two come together. There is a common factor that binds together these two things viz. the pot and the rope. The factor is that both the items are sāvayava, composed of parts. Extending this analogy contrastively, one can see that things which are not sāvayava cannot partake of getting conjoined (or even its opposite). Of the two viz. ātman and manas, the former is definitely not sāvayava. And hence, the very question of yoga (saṁyoga or viyoga - joining or separating) cannot be conceivable.

Hence it is not proper to speak in the strain of the Vaiśeṣika-s of any conjunction of ātman and manas.

No conjunction between sāvayava and niravayava
न हि सावयवं विगतावयवैःविगतावयवं च न सावयवैः।
उपयाति युजामिति दृष्टमिदंयत एवमतः स्थितमुक्तमदः ॥ 029 ॥

nahi sāvayavaṁ vigatāvayavairvigatāvayavaṁ na ca sāvayavaiḥ ।
upayāti yujāmiti dṛṣṭamidaṁ yata evamataḥ sthitamuktamadaḥ ॥ 29 ॥
An object made of parts (sāvayava) cannot get conjoined with an object not made of parts. Nor can an object not made of parts get conjoined with one made of parts. This is patent; it is for this reason that the statement has been made.

Of the two, ātman and manas, the former is not made of parts, but the latter is. The former is niravayava (called here vigatāvayava), whereas the latter is sāvayava. It is improper therefore to speak of the conjoining of ātman and manas.

Limitations of imagination
न हि कल्पितभागसमागमनंविगतावयवस्य घटेत, कुतः।
वितथत्वमतिः सुदृढा तु यतःपरिकल्पितवस्तुषु इत्यमुतः ॥ 030 ॥

nahi kalpitabhāgasamāgamanaṁ vigatāvayavasya ghaṭeta kutaḥ ।
vitathatvamatiḥ sudṛḍhā tu yataḥ parikalpitavastuṣu ityamutaḥ ॥ 30 ॥
It cannot be supposed that a non-partite (vigatāvayava) thing can conjoin with the imagined part of something. For, the notion that the thing imagined is unreal, after all, is clearly well-grounded in our mind.

Consider the "relation" between two things of which one is niravayava and the other is sāvayava - for example of ether and that of the pot. The question is - Is it not possible to imagine, just imagine, that the ether has some portions, and that the imaginary portion has conjoined with the pot? The answer is - no, it is not possible. For, in regard to things imagined, the feat of their being merely imaginary is clearly present in our mind. Our mind cannot be divested of this notion for the truth of this is very clearly known even at the outset, and is therefore continually present all along in the mind.

All else than Īśvara impermanent
इह वेदशिरःसु तदर्थविदःप्रवदन्ति समस्तजगत्प्रकृतिम्।
परमात्मपदं दृशिमात्रवपुर्ध्रुवमेकमतोऽन्यदनित्यमिति ॥ 031 ॥

iha vedaśiraḥsu tadarthavidaḥ pravadanti samastajagatprakṛtim ।
paramātmapadaṁ dṛśimātravapurdhruvamekamato'nyadanityamiti ॥ 31 ॥
Those who know the import of the same declare that in the Upaniṣad-s [it has been stated that] the Lord, the material cause of the entire world is [undoubtedly] singular, being of the nature of the seer, and is permanent; all else is impermanent.

The Lord is the prakṛti or the stuff out of which the entire world is made. That is what those knowledgeable in the Upaniṣad-s declare.

The Lord is to be pitted against the world, nevertheless. The Lord alone is permanent, and all else is ephemeral. The Lord is the sole Seer, and so, by implication all else falls under the category of the seen. Whatever is not the Seer, is then, impermanent. By implication, the faculties - the mind etc - are necessarily not permanent.

No impermanent features in what is Permanent
अत एव न किञ्चिदुदाहरणंध्रुवमस्ति परस्य विनाशिगुणम्।
यत एवमतः स्थितमुक्तमदोन हि नित्यमनित्यगुणेन गुणि ॥ 032 ॥

ata eva na kiñcidudāharaṇaṁ dhruvamasti parasya vināśiguṇam ।
yata evamataḥ sthitamuktamado nahi nityamanityaguṇena guṇi ॥ 32 ॥
The opponent has, therefore, no example to offer for something permanent having an impermanent guṇa. That was the very reason for our saying [earlier]: the permanent can have no impermanent guṇa.

The opponent, here, is the Naiyāyika. If it is sought to be shown that ahaṅkāra etc are features of ātman, the idea here shows how it is just impossible. This idea was stated in verse 25 also.

Ahaṅkāra an object, not subject
उपलभ्यमहङ्करणं भवितुंक्षमते दृशिरूपगुणो न यतः।
विषयाकृतिरञ्जितधीगुणवत्विषयत्वमहङ्करणस्य ततः ॥ 033 ॥

upalabhyamahaṅkaraṇaṁ bhavituṁ kṣamate dṛśirūpaguṇo na yataḥ ।
viṣayākṛtirañjitadhīguṇavad viṣayatvamahaṅkaraṇasya tataḥ ॥ 33 ॥
Ahaṅkāra is fit only to be an object perceived, never to become the seer. Just as the mind is tinged by the shape of the object, so is the ahaṅkāra but an object [of the self].

The mind assumes, it is agreed, the shape of the object perceived. Even as the pot is seen, the mind assuming the shape of the pot too is perceived by the self. The self alone is the seer.

The Self as witness to the world and the I
विषयप्रकृतिं प्रतिपन्नवतींमतिवृत्तिमहङ्करणं च मतेः।
उभयं परिपश्यति योऽविकृतःपरमात्मसदुक्तिरसौ पुरुषः ॥ 034 ॥

viṣayaprakṛtiṁ pratipannavatīṁ mativṛttimahaṅkaraṇaṁ ca mateḥ ।
ubhayaṁ paripaśyati yo'vikṛtaḥ paramātmasaduktirasau puruṣaḥ ॥ 34 ॥
The Paramātman is that puruṣa, who, undergoing no change himself, witnesses both viz. the mental modes that assume the very nature of the object perceived, as well as the I-ness of the mind itself; he is hence called sat.

Paramātman is the puruṣa. He looks on at things that keep changing, Himself remaining unchanging. Two things that keep changing are witnessed by the puruṣa: the first is the mental mode which has come to assume the shape of the perceived object; the second is that aspect of the mind viz. the ahaṅkāra, which is what is felt as the seer.

The Seer is Paramātman, also called sat.

The double reference to the self
ननु देहभृदेष कथं भवताऽभिहितः परमात्मसदुक्तिरिति।
न विरुद्धमवादिषमेतमहंश्रुतिरप्यमुमर्थमुवाच यतः ॥ 035 ॥

nanu dehabhṛdeṣa kathaṁ bhavatā'bhihitaḥ paramātmasaduktiriti ।
na viruddhamavādiṣametadahaṁ śrutirapyamumarthamuvāca yataḥ ॥ 35 ॥
“How come you spoke of the individual self (deha-bhṛd) as the Paramātman and the one entitled ‘sat’?” “No, I have not spoken contrarily: for, the śruti (Veda) itself has spoken of this idea.”

It is often the case that the jīva, the individual self, is spoken of as the seer. Hence the question is raised as to whether there is a mix-up. The answer given is that the Veda-s themselves speak in such a strain too.

Eight Upaniṣadic References
अमतं न मतेरमतस्तदिदंयदमुत्र तदेव तु कश्चिदिति।
श्रुतिषु प्रतिपादितमस्य दृशेःपरमात्मपदत्वममूषु भृशम् ॥ 036 ॥

amataṁ na materamatastadidaṁ yadamutra tadeva tu kaściditi ।
śrutiṣu pratipāditamasya dṛśeḥ paramātmapadatvamamūṣu bhṛśam ॥ 36 ॥
In these Vedic statements it has been set forth clearly that the seer is the Paramātman:1. amatam… 2. na mateḥ...3. amataḥ...4. tad/tat...5. idam...6. yad amutra...7. kaścid...

The references here are to these statements in the Upaniṣad-s: 1. BU 3.2.11 अमतं मन्तृ अविज्ञातं विज्ञातृ The Self is what thinks, but not what is thought; it is what comprehends, but not what is comprehended.(b) BU 3.4.2 na matermantāraṁ manvīthāḥ You cannot conceive of the conceiver of the mind.(c) BU 3.7.23 amato mantā He is the thinker who is [cannot be] thought of.(d) BU 2.5.19 tadetad brahmāpūrvam This Brahman is the one without an antecedent [cause].(e) CU 6.8.7 tattvamasi You are That(f) BU 2.4.6 idaṁ sarvaṁ yadayamātmā All this is this self.(g) KU 2.4.10 yadeveha tadamutra yadamutra tadanviha What is here is itself the one yonder; and the one beyond is the one that is here.(h) KU 2.4.1 kaścid dhīraḥ pratyagātmānamaikṣad āvṛttacakṣuramṛtatvamicchan Desirous of immortality, it is the rare man of wisdom that turns his gaze back and beholds the self within.

All these Vedic statements bespeak of the seer as the Paramātman.

Beyond and beneath the faculties
यदनभ्युदितं वदनेन सदानयनेन च पश्यति यन्न सदा।
श्रवणेन च यन्न शृणोति सदामनसापि च यन्मनुते न सदा ॥ 037 ॥

yadanabhyuditaṁ vadanena sadā nayanena ca paśyati yanna sadā ।
śravaṇena ca yanna śṛṇoti sadā manasā'pi ca yanmanute na sadā ॥ 37 ॥
वदनं नयनं च तथा श्रवणंमन एव च येन मतं सततम्।
अवगच्छ तदेव पदं परमंत्वमिति श्रुतिरीक्षितुरुक्तवती ॥ 038 ॥

vadanaṁ nayanaṁ ca tathā śravaṇaṁ mana eva ca yena mataṁ satatam ।
avagaccha tadeva padaṁ paramaṁ tvamiti śrutirīkṣituruktavatī ॥ 38 ॥

That which remains unuttered, by the faculty of speech; that which one can never see with his eye; that which one never can hear with his ear; that which one does not understand with his mind;

[and on the other hand] that which impels the faculty of speech, comprehends the eye, the ear, and the mind - know that every thing as the Supreme Abode, which is what yourself are - is what the Veda has stated.

The various faculties are all impelled by the seer. And that seer is the Abode Supreme, which you are. This is what the Veda-s tell the seer.

The Sat has guṇa-s such as aṇiman
परमात्मपदत्व इयं च मयाश्रुतिरल्पकणोक्तिरिहाभिहिता।
अणिमादिगुणं सदिति प्रकृतंतदसि त्वमिति श्रुतिरभ्यवदत् ॥ 039 ॥

paramātmapadatva iyaṁ ca mayā śrutiralpakaṇoktirihābhihitā ।
aṇimādiguṇaṁ saditi prakṛtaṁ tadasi tvamiti śrutirapyavadat ॥ 39 ॥
In regard to the Abode of the Paramātman, the Vedic passages cited by me are but a few. The Sat, endowed with the characteristics such as aṇiman, which is what is pertinent here, is what you are: so says the Veda.

There are many Vedic passages that can corroborate the idea that is being discussed viz. The one about the abode of Paramātman. Only a few, a very small number of them, have been cited here.

The Supreme, called Sat, is endowed with the eight powers or possessions listed famously as aṇiman, mahiman etc . The Sat which is being treated here, and yourself, are but one. This is what the Veda says.

The reference to Sat above is to CU 6.2.1 sadeva somyedamagra āsīdekamevādvitīyam. What originally was (= what preceded creation), is this Sat, a singular without a second. It is towards the end of the above passage that the words tattvamasi appear.

Neither a portion nor a modification
नभसोऽवयवो विकृतिश्च यथाघटिकादिनभो न भवेत्तु यथा।
परमात्मन एष न चावयवोविकृतिश्च शरीरभृदित्यमृषा ॥ 040 ॥

nabhaso'vayavo vikṛtiśca yathā ghaṭakādinabho na bhavettu tathā ।
paramātmana eṣa na cāvayavo vikṛtiśca śarīrabhṛdityamṛṣā ॥ 40 ॥
Ether, as enclosed by a pot or similar things, is neither a portion of ether, nor a modification thereof. Even so, truly, the sentient person is no portion of the Paramātman nor a modification thereof.

Ether (ākāśa) encased in a pot is no division of ether outside. Ghaṭākaśa and mahākāśa, as the two sometimes are called, do not bear a relationship of the part and the whole. Mahākāśa is impartite. What applies to the pot can apply to the other such spatial enclosures such as a room or hall, and what applies to the ether in the pot applies equally well here too.

Nor should it be deemed that the ghaṭākāśa is the mahākāśa itself that has undergone some transformation. Ākāśa cannot be fragmented, nor can it be deformed. Even so is Paramātman impartite and immutable. And so the seer cannot be labelled as a portion of Paramātman nor a modification of Paramātman.

All this is by no means false (ityamṛṣā).

Space : pot :: Paramātman : jīva
करकादिनिमित्तकमेव यथाकरकाम्बरनाम भवेद्वियतः।
परमात्मदृशेरपि नाम तथापरहेतुकमेव तु जीव इति ॥ 041 ॥

karakādinimittakameva yathā karakāmbaranāma bhavedviyataḥ ।
paramātmadṛśerapi nāma tathā purahetukameva tu jīva iti ॥ 41 ॥
Ākāśa gets the name karakākāśa owing to causes like the kamaṇḍalu (the sacred pot). Even so the name jīva to the Paramātman, the Seer, owing to certain extraneous causes.

The kamaṇḍalu is carried by sages to carry and use the water therein. When it is ‘empty’, it has ether within. The expression karakākāśa is similar to ghaṭākāśa. Thus, ākāśa gets the label karakākāśa owing to the extraneous container.

So it is here. The seer as Paramātman gets the label jīva owing to the extraneous condition.

Creation followed by entrance
जनितं वियदग्रणि येन जगत्परमात्मसदक्षरनामभृता।
प्रविवेश स एव जगत्स्वकृतंखमिवेह घटं घटसृष्टिमनु ॥ 042 ॥

janitaṁ viyadagraṇi yena jagatparamātmasadakṣaranāmabhṛtā ।
praviveśa sa eva jagatsvakṛtaṁ khamiveha ghaṭaṁ ghaṭasṛṣṭimanu ॥ 42 ॥
As would ākāśa here enter into a pot on the very heels of the creation of the pot, so did the being entitled [variously as] Paramātman, Sad, and Akṣara (the Supreme Self/the Being/the Imperishable) by whom was this world created with ākāśa in the lead, enter the world which is its own creation.

The moment a pot is made, ākāśa fills it within. This analogy - of the creation of the pot and the immediate occupancy of the ākāśa therein - is the closest analogy that can fit the context of the creation of the world. For ākāśa was the first creation of the Lord. The other elements issued subsequently in a serial way, one from the other (as pointed out in TU).

Hence the creation of the world is spoken of as having ākāśa in the forefront. जगत् वियदग्रणि means the world has viyat (=ākāśa) as its leader (=agraṇi).

And soon after the creation, the Lord entered into the same, as pointed out in TU, again. (The relevant passages from TU are: 2.1 tasmād vā etasmād ātmana ākāśaḥ sambhūtaḥ etc 2.6 tat sṛṣṭvā tadevā’nu prāviśat).

The Lord is known by the names Paramātman, Sad, and Akṣara.

The Prime Principle evident in the evolutes
उदपद्यत खप्रमुखं हि जगत्परमात्मन इत्यपि याः श्रुतयः।
अवधार्यत आभिरभेदमतिःपरमात्मसतत्त्वसमर्पणतः ॥ 043 ॥

udapadyata khapramukhaṁ hi jagatparamātmana ityapi yāḥ śrutayaḥ ।
avadhāryata ābhirabhedamatiḥ paramātmasatattvasamarpaṇataḥ ॥ 43 ॥
“The world originated from Paramātman, with ākāśa as its leading element” - so say Vedic passages. And even these passages speak of the very offering of the Paramātmic Principle [into the world] and thus a non-dual idea is ascertained from them.

The passages that speak of the creation of the world, with ākāśa as its first and primary elemental creation also speak of a kind of pouring, or rather a full scale offer, of the Supreme Self into the world. In other words, the “stuff” of the world in no wise differs from what Paramātman is. From this commonality of content issues a sense of nondifference.

The (f)utility of creation described
यदि सृष्टिविधानपरं वचनंफलशून्यमनर्थकमेव भवेत्।
जगदित्थमजायत धातुरितिश्रवणं पुरुषस्य फलाय नहि ॥ 044 ॥

yadi sṛṣṭividhānaparaṁ vacanaṁ phalaśūnyamanarthakameva bhavet ।
jagaditthamajāyata dhāturiti śravaṇaṁ puruṣasya phalāya na hi ॥ 44 ॥
It would be a mere waste should the Vedic statements describing the steps and process of creation were fruitless. Hearing Vedic passages that say “This is how the world was born of Brahmā” would serve no purpose whatsoever.

Obviously, passages portraying the processes of creation ought to be helpful to the sādhaka in some manner : what and how thereof must then be stated.

The evolutes are unreal
अनृतत्वमवाद्यसकृद्विकृतेःनिरधारि सदेव तु सत्यमिति।
श्रुतिभिर्बहुधैतदतोऽवगतंजगतो न हि जन्म विधेयमिति ॥ 045 ॥

anṛtatvamavādyasakṛdvikṛterniradhāri sadeva tu satyamiti ।
śrutibhirbahudhaitadato'vagataṁ jagato na hi janma vidheyamiti ॥ 45 ॥
More than once has been stated the unreality of the mutative world; and settled variously too that Sad alone is true; from which can it be inferred that details of the birth of the world little deserve to be stated.

Before proceeding to describe something, one ought to know what for should whatever be described. There can be no point in describing something that hardly abides.

What is ever-abiding is what is known by the designation Sad. This has been very clearly established. What is also stated multiple times is that the universe, subject to many changes, is unreal.

What is known by implication from the very many Vedic passages is that there is no point in merely setting forth the creation of the world.

Genesis - when it makes sense
न च तत्त्वमसीत्यसकृद्वचनंजगतो जनिमात्रविधौ घटते।
परमात्मपदानुमतिं तु यदाजनयेत् पुरुषस्य तदा घटते ॥ 046 ॥

na ca tattvamasītyasakṛdvacanaṁ jagato janimātravidhau ghaṭate ।
paramātmapadānumatiṁ tu yadā janayetpuruṣasya tadā ghaṭate ॥ 46 ॥
The multiple utterances [in the Veda] viz. Tat-tvam-asi (“You are That”) would hardly make sense were they to pertain merely to the genesis of the world. It would, however, make sense when it can generate for man the knowledge of the Principle of Paramātman.

Certain statements repeat in the Veda. Reiterations are made with certain specific goals in mind. No such purpose is served by the mere narration of the genesis of the world.

Repetitions can make sense when they have the role or purpose of laying emphasis on some key idea. Such a key idea can only be the generation - in the mind of the listener, the seeker - of the idea of the Lord. Repetitions ought to have a focus. The reference here is to CU 6.8 tat-tvam-asi.

The Immutable Witness
स्थिरजङ्गमदेहधियां चरितंपरिपश्यति योऽविकृतः पुरुषः।
परमात्मसदुक्तिरसाविति यत्फणितं तदतिष्ठिपमित्थमहम् ॥ 047 ॥

sthirajaṅgamadehadhiyāṁ caritaṁ paripaśyati yo'vikṛtaḥ puruṣaḥ ।
paramātmasaduktirasāviti yadbhaṇitaṁ tadatiṣṭhipamitthamaham ॥ 47 ॥
Thus have I demonstrated what I said earlier - that it is the changeless Person who witnesses the functions of the immobile and the mobile, of the body and mind, that is designated as Paramātman and as Sad.

It was stated by the author earlier that it is the ātman [alone] who is of the nature of the seer, and that all else, stationary and otherwise, body or intellect - all fall under the category of the seen. It is that very Person, the Seer, that has been referred to in the Vedic passages - as Paramātman and as Sad.

The idea stated earlier has thus been established here, claims the author.

Croc and water; pot and ether
पृथगेव यदाऽक्षरतो मतिवित्मकरोदकवन्न घटाम्बरवत्।
न विरोत्स्यति तत्त्वमसीति तदावचनं कथमेष त इत्यपि च ॥ 048 ॥

pṛthageva yadā'kṣarato mativinmakarodakavanna ghaṭāmbaravat ।
na virotsyati tattvamasīti tadā vacanaṁ kathameṣa sa ityapi ca ॥ 48 ॥
The statement that the ātman, the witness to the intellect, is indeed different from the Imperishable [Paramātman] - even as the crocodile is different from the water - and not as the [ākāśa inside] the pot and the ākāśa [outside it]; how can such a statement not go contradictory to [the Vedic passage] “Tat-tvam-asi”, and “eṣa ta ātmā”?

The opponent is giving a wrong example, and the idea conveyed by the same goes contradictory to two [famous and clear] Vedic passages. The opponent gives the example of the crocodile and water, which are totally different from one another. He cites this example to show that the witness to the intellect viz. the jīva, the individual self, is different from the imperishable principle viz. The Paramātman.

The right example, on the other hand, would be ghaṭākāśa and mahākāśa, ether confined within a pot, and ether unconfined, outside the pot. There is non-difference between the two, in contrast with the example offered by the opponent (which only goes to emphasise the difference between makara and udaka, the crocodile and the water).

As against the example given by the opponent, the author cites two passages from the Veda-s which bring out an exactly opposite idea. The famous passages are “tat-tvam-asi”, and “eṣa ta ātmā”, both of which are already dealt with.

Issue: Upāsanā is prescribed
न तु वस्तुसतत्त्वविबोधनकृत्विनिवर्तयदप्रतिबोधमिदम्।
सदुपासनकर्मविधानपरंयत एवमतो न विरोत्स्यति मे ॥ 049 ॥

na tu vastusatattvavibodhanakṛdvinivartayadapratibodhamidam ।
sadupāsanakarmavidhānaparaṁ tata eva mataṁ na virotsyati me ॥ 49 ॥
“It is not right to say that dispelling ignorance, this [Vedic statement] imparts the knowledge of reality. For, it [the statement] sets out to prescribe the karman viz. the upāsanā (worship) of Sad; such being the case it is not against my own position.”

The verse states the view of the opponent. The standard view is that the Vedic statement has two objectives - (a) awaken the listener in regard to the true nature of what is; and (b) removing ignorance.

As against this, the opponent’s view is that the Vedic statement referred to pertains to prescribing the performance of a karman which has as its content the worship of the Sad. This being the case, there is no way that the Vedic statement goes counter to my stand, he claims.

In other words, there is a basic difference in the very way in which the famous Vedic statement is understood by the opponent and the proponent.

The essential idea is that abheda-śruti-s are designed to dispel ignorance and enlighten the individual seeker; this is the standard view. However, the opponent’s view is that even abheda-śruti-s can prescribe karman-s. There could therefore be no contradictions, he claims.

Pratimā as divinity
मनआदिषु कारणदृष्टिविधिःप्रतिमासु च देवधियां करणम्।
स्वमतिं ह्यनपोह्य यथा तु तथात्वमसीह सदात्ममतिर्वचनात् ॥ 050 ॥

manaādiṣu kāraṇadṛṣṭividhiḥ pratimāsu ca devadhiyāṁ karaṇam ।
svamatiṁ tvanapohya yathā hi tathā tvamasīti sadātmamatirvacanāt ॥ 50 ॥
There is the prescription that manas must be conceived as its cause [viz. Brahman]; so too, conceiving as divinity prescribed in regard to icons; and [in these cases] there is no nullification of one’s own self [as a different entity]. It is on similar lines that one is to conceive of one’s own self as sadātman, as per the Vedic statement “[tat] tvam asi”.

We find many injunctions in the Vedic literature. What is the import of these injunctions? This is the question taken up here.

There are passages that speak of upāsanā (worship). Thus, we have the statement “Honour manas as Brahman” (CU 3.18.1 mano brahmetyupāsīta). Similar is the practice of deeming icons (pratimā-s) as divinities for purposes of upāsanā. Thus, there are clear injunctions that ask you to identify one thing with another, or rather identify one as another; and this is as a part of the act of worship, or even of spiritual inquiry. Pratimā-s are not gods, yet one is supposed to see them as gods, almost deeming one as equal to the other. More accurately, one is called upon to handle pratimā-s as if they are indeed deva-s.

In the progression of spiritual enquiry, one is again urged to have the view of Brahman in respect of manas. Brahman is the cause and manas is the effect. But the injunction is to look upon the effect as the very cause it came from.

All the same, one cannot miss the fact that in the context of the implementation of such dṛṣṭi-vidhi-s (injunctions where one is ordained to “look upon A as B”), one does not totally miss or do away with one’s own awareness (sva-mati) of the difference between the thing handled and the deva-dhī, which has been cited as the example in the verse. Obliteration of this awareness is the apoha of sva-mati, which in matter of fact does not, because cannot, take place.

Against this background, the argument of the opponent is that even tat-tvam-asi can be and ought to be construed as a similar injunction. With such construal, one can still be aware of the truth of the difference between tat and tvam, and yet treat this as dṛṣṭi-vidhi. Thus the pratimā comes to be looked upon as the deva; even so is manas looked upon as Brahman - and in both cases the aspirant is conscious of the difference between the two. So with looking upon tvam as tat. The difference that actually exists between the two cannot be wished away for the mind can be clearly aware of the difference even while acting as per the injunction to view one as the other.

Such Vedic statements that call upon the aspirant to consider A as B are called abheda-śruti-s. Such abheda-śruti-s indicate ordinances for the sake of certain upāsanā-s. They cannot however erase an existent difference between the two, and even the aspirant could invariably be aware of the difference between the thing at hand and the idea invoked upon the thing.

This is the stand taken by the opponent, the pūrva-pakṣin.

Analogy : He is a lion
अथवा त्वमिति ध्वनिवाच्यमिदंसदसीति वदेद्वचनं गुणतः।
विभयं पुरुषं प्रवदन्ति यथामृगराडयमीश्वरगुप्त इति ॥ 051 ॥

athavā tvamitidhvanivācyamidaṁ sadasīti vadedvacanaṁ guṇataḥ ।
vibhayaṁ puruṣaṁ pravadanti yathā mṛgarāḍayamīśvaragupta iti ॥ 51 ॥
Alternatively, the statement sad asi (“You are the sad”) could be a statement of suggestion, and issued as per a secondary expression (called guṇa-vṛtti or gauṇī-vṛtti). This is after the analogy of the statement regarding a fearless person as "This Īśvaragupta is [indeed] a lion".

Another pūrvapakṣa is stated here. And this consists in taking the Vedic statement being discussed in a secondary sense, which is common in usage. Instead of referring to a person, (by name, say, Īśvaragupta) as brave and fearless in a plain manner, we sometimes say "This Īśvaragupta is verily the King of animals". This does not make him a lion.

Even so, "sad asi" is said only secondarily.

Analogy :You are Indra/Viṣṇu
यदि वा स्तुतये सदसीति वदेत्मघवानसि विष्णुरसीति यथा।
त्वमिति श्रुतिवाच्यसतत्त्वकतांअथवा सत एव वदेद्वचनम् ॥ 052 ॥

yadi vā stutaye sadasīti vadenmaghavānasi viṣṇurasīti yathā ।
tvamitiśrutivācyasatattvakatāmathavā sata eva vadedvacanam ॥ 52 ॥
Alternatively, it is only for praise that the statement “sad asi” is made - just as in [the statements] “You are Indra”, “You are Viṣṇu”; The statement in such a case would rather be one about the ‘Sat’ (Brahman) itself, and “You” would be coplanar with what is expressly stated by the Veda.

This verse deals with the issue of stuti, the same as arthavāda. In a way, even praise indirectly made is a secondary usage. ‘Tvam’, understood in the two examples provided in the first half of the verse, accords well with the statement of the Veda, for ‘tvam’ is expressly stated there. The two are therefore of a category (satattva).

It could even be perceived as words applicable to ‘Sat’ itself.

Suggestive Mode ?
यदि तत्त्वमिति ध्वनिनाभिहितःपरमात्मसतत्त्वक एव सदा।
किमिति स्वकमेव न रूपमवेत्प्रतिबोध्यत एव यतो वचनैः ॥ 053 ॥

yadi tattvamiti dhvaninā'bhihitaḥ paramātmasatattvaka eva sadā ।
kimiti svakameva na rūpamavetpratibodhyata eva yato vacanaiḥ ॥ 53 ॥
If it is the case that he who has been described by the way of suggestion in the words ‘tat tvam’ is of a class with Paramātman always, then arises the question - why did he not know his own svarūpa (true nature) - so much so that the Veda has had to wake him up through so many words?

If he who has been addressed as ‘tvam’ has been of the self-same nature as Paramātman all the time, then how come he did not happen to realise his very own nature? The contingency - of the Veda endeavouring him to wake him up with so many words - would not even have then arisen!

Model to interpret other statements too
अत एव हि जीवसदात्मकतांन हि तत्त्वमसीति वदेद्वचनम्।
यदपीदृशमन्यदतो वचनंतदपि प्रथयेदनयैव दिशा ॥ 054 ॥

ata eva hi jīvasadātmakatāṁ nahi tattvamasīti vadedvacanam ।
yadapīdṛśamanyadato vacanaṁ tadapi prathayedanayaiva diśā ॥ 54 ॥
It can therefore be concluded that the utterance viz tat tvam asi cannot speak of the jīva being sadātmaka. And further, whatever utterance else is of a similar character can be explained away in this very fashion.

For reasons stated in the previous verse, it could be averred that the celebrated statement does not speak of the jīva as being of the nature of Sat. There are of course other statements that are similar to this one. But then, all those statements too can be, and ought to be, interpreted similarly. And thus, advaita is not what is sanctioned by the Veda.

All this constitutes the pūrvapakṣa.

Reply: Note the disparity
त्वदुदाहृतवाक्यविलक्षणतावचनस्य हि तत्त्वमसीति यतः।
अत एव न दृष्टिविधानपरंसत एव सदात्मकतागमकम् ॥ 055 ॥

tvadudāhṛtavākyavilakṣaṇatā vacanasya hi tattvamasīti yataḥ ।
ata eva na dṛṣṭividhānaparaṁ sata eva sadātmakatāgamakam ॥ 55 ॥
There is disparity between the sentences cited by you and the statement “tat tvam asi”. It is for this reason that this statement is not one that enjoins a dṛṣṭi (envisagement); but on the other hand, it is one that enlightens Sat of its very nature as Sat.

The pūrvapakṣin had attempted to place mano brahmetyupāsīta and tattvamasi on par with each other. There is a clear disparity between what is dṛṣṭi-vidhāyaka and what is svarūpa-gamaka. The former is an upāsanā-vākya and the latter is ātmānusandhāna-darśaka. The first enjoins certain actions, and the latter imparts knowledge.

Note the role of “iti”
इतिशब्दशिरस्कपदोक्तमतिःविहिता मनआदिषु तैर्वचनैः।
न विधानमिहास्ति तथा वचनेसुविलक्षणमेतदतो वचनात् ॥ 056 ॥

iti śabdaśiraskapadoktamatirvihitā manaādiṣu tairvacanaiḥ ।
na vidhānamihāsti tathā vacane suvilakṣaṇametadato vacanāt ॥ 56 ॥
In utterances that begin with ‘manaḥ’ [taken up above], there is an injunction of mentation stated by words that have ‘iti’ at their head. But such an injunction is not in this utterance. Hence this statement is divergent from those utterances.

In sentences such as mano brahmetyupāsīta, we have the injunction to mentally deem something as something else (here manas as brahman); and deeming X as Y involves the expression ‘as’ – which is conveyed by ‘iti’ in Sanskrit.

This pattern is conspicuously absent in tat tvam asi. There is no vidhāna, injunction here. It is for some purpose that X is deemed as Y in the former, where the difference between X and Y is different, though for the goal to be achieved, the act is enjoined. On the other hand, the pattern is A is [the same as] B.

Hence there is a difference in the very structure of the sentences. The two ought not be considered parallel or equal. Sentences of a similar pattern could possibly give rise to similar understandings. Not ones dissimilar to one another. “Treat/Deem X as Y”, and “A is B” are sentences which are dissimilar in structure.

Difference between “Sat” and “Upāsya”
मनसो वियतः सवितृप्रभृतेःप्रवदन्ति न तानि सदात्मकताम्।
मनआदि हि मुख्यमुपास्यतयाप्रवदन्ति यतोऽक्षरदृष्टियुतम् ॥ 057 ॥

manaso viyataḥ savitṛprabhṛteḥ pravadanti na tāni sadātmakatām ।
manaādi hi mukhyamupāsyatayā pravadanti yato'kṣaradṛṣṭiyutam ॥ 57 ॥
The Vedic statements do not speak of manas or ākāśa or savitṛ (mind/sky/the sun) as being of the nature of Sat. In contrast, they speak of manas etc as essentially upāsya (objects of contemplation) and speak of perceiving them as Akṣara (the Brahman).

It is not merely with regard to manas that there are injunctions - to perceive them as the very Akṣara (the Brahman). Similarly, viyat and savitṛ etc are not spoken of as sadātmaka.

It demands no extraordinary sense to note that sentences of perception (Construe/Perceive/ Pursue X as Y) and sentences of equation (A is B) are not to be construed alike.

Can “iti” be a waste?
करको न मृदः पृथगस्ति यथामनआदि सतोऽस्ति तथा न पृथक्।
इति वस्तुसतत्त्वकता तु यदाविधिशब्द इतिश्च तदा तु वृथा ॥ 058 ॥

karako na mṛdaḥ pṛthagasti yathā manaādi sato'sti tathā na pṛthak ।
iti vastusatattvakatā tu yathā vidhiśabda itiśca tathā tu vṛthā ॥ 58 ॥
The pot is no different from the mud. If on the same analogy one were to say that manas etc are no different from sat, and hence are mere statements of truth, then the word expressing the vidhi (injunction) and the word iti would go waste.

There is a difference between the mud-pot relation and manas-sat relation. The former states an equation and the latter an upāsanā. The presence of the two items iti and upāsīta are evident in the latter; whereas a mere statement of fact is what obtains in the first.

The difference between a factual statement and an injunctive statement needs to be emphasised , one can say karakaḥ mṛd asti but we also say manaḥ brahma [ityupāsīta]. We do not get statements like karako brahmetyupāsīta or, for that matter mano brahmāsti.

Statements of upāsanā have not pretensions to statements of facts. Facts do not involve upāsanā.

Vidhi and iti justified
मनआदिसमानविभक्तितयाविधिशब्दमितिं च विहाय यदि।
जनकेन सता सहयोगमियात्अनृतं तदिति स्फुटमुक्तमभूत् ॥ 059 ॥

manaādisamānavibhaktitayā vidhiśabdamitiṁ ca vihāya yadi ।
janakena satā sahayogamiyādanṛtaṁ taditi sphuṭamuktamabhūt ॥ 59 ॥
Abandoning both the vidhi-śabda (word(s) enjoining an action) and the word ‘iti’, if manas, or other similar words, were to be conjoined with what created it [viz. Brahman] in the same grammatical case, the implication would have been a clear statement that it is unreal.

What the author is pointing out is the difference between the actual Vedic statement viz. (a) mano brahmetyupāsīta, and a novel, hypothetical statement viz. (b) mano brahma. The latter also misses the two words iti and upāsīta. The presence of these two words indicates that what is being stated is plainly an upāsanā. It would not be a statement of non-difference between manas and brahma.

One may also consider what would have been the implication of the statement (b). Such a statement would have been on par with karako mṛttikā or kuṇḍalaṁ suvarṇam. In these two examples, the former is the effect and the latter is the cause. Manas, then, would similarly be the effect, and Brahman the cause. Thus, there is the kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva between the two.

Now, whenever there is an assertion of non-difference between kārya and kāraṇa, it is presumed that the kārya or the effect is anṛta, untrue, and the kāraṇa is satya, true. Applying the analogy here, we find that manas is anṛta and brahman is satya. The pūrvapakṣin, on the other hand, is saying that statements like “mano brahma [ityupāsīta]” would imply a secondary sense. There is thus a difference between sentences, like mano brahmetyupāsīta and tattvamasi. The two have to be analysed on different grounds, in different ways.

Same Case, opposite interpretation?
ननु जीवसतोरपि तत्त्वमितिस्फुटमेकविभक्त्यभिधानमिदम्।
कथमस्य शरीरभृतोऽनृततान भवेदविभक्तविभक्तियुजः ॥ 060 ॥

nanu jīvasatorapi tattvamiti sphuṭamekavibhaktyabhidhānamidam ।
kathamasya śarīrabhṛto'nṛtatā na bhavedavibhaktavibhaktiyujaḥ ॥ 60 ॥
In the statement viz. Tattvamasi, the two words jīva and sat are clearly in the same case.Such being the case, how can there be an unreality of the jīva which has the same case- termination?

In tattvamasi we have two words viz tat and tvam in the same case. They are thus ekavibhaktika. Alternatively, tvam is avibhakta-vibhakti-yuta, being in a case no different from that of tat.

Taking along the lines of karako mṛttikā asti, where karaka is the effect and mṛttikā is the cause (and the cause is abiding and the effect is ephemeral); in tattvamasi, tat is the cause, and tvam is the effect. Applying the analogy, tvam referring to the jīva or the dehin (referred to in the verse as śarīrabhṛt, has to be anṛta or mithyā.

This is the question raised by the pūrvapakṣin.

Prakṛti and vikṛti in the same Case?
प्रकृतेरभिधानपदेन यदाविकृतेरभिधानमुपैति युजाम्।
अनृतत्वमतिस्तु तदा विकृतौमृदयं घट इत्यभिधासु यथा ॥ 061 ॥

prakṛterabhidhānapadena yathā vikṛterabhidhānamupaiti yujām ।
anṛtatvamatistu tathā vikṛtau mṛdayaṁ ghaṭa ityabhidhāsu yathā ॥ 61 ॥
It is only when a word expressing modification (vikṛti) is stated alongside a word expressing the material cause (prakṛti) that the idea is conveyed - that the modified (vikṛti) is unreal - as in cases such as “This pot is but mud”.

This is the reply given by the siddhāntin.

In sentences like “A is B”, it is obvious that A and B are in the same case or vibhakti. The author points out that in the verse that it is only in a particular case that it can be said that one of the two is unreal. What is that condition?

Let us take the case where A represents the pot and B represents the mud. In such cases it can be averred that what is expressed by A is mithyā, but what is expressed by B is not. Why? Of the two, the pot and the mud, the pot is the effect and the mud is the cause. A is the abhidhāna or expression for the vikṛti (effect), and B is the that for prakṛti (cause). When A is stated along with B, A is perceived as false, anṛta. Ayaṁ ghaṭaḥ is A and mṛt is B.

But in the case of tattvamasi, tvam is not an abhidhāna of vikṛti whence it could be deemed as anṛta. In other words, the jīva is not a vikṛti whence it cannot be seen as anṛta. Therefore, there is no prakṛti-vikṛti-bhāva between Brahman and jīva.

Real and Unreal : Prakṛti and vikṛti
विकृतित्वमवादि मनःप्रभृतेःबहुषु श्रुतिषु प्रकृतेस्तु सतः।
अत एव समानविभक्तितयामनआदि सुवेद्यमसत्यतया ॥ 062 ॥

vikṛtitvamavādi manaḥprabhṛterbahuśaḥ śrutiṣu prakṛtestu sataḥ ।
ata eva samānavibhaktitayā manaādi suvedyamasatyamiti ॥ 62 ॥
The mind etc are spoken of in many Vedic passages as vikṛti-s from the prakṛti viz. Sat (=Brahma). And it is for this reason that when spoken of in the same case, manas etc are easily discernible as untrue.

Passages in TU and MaU speak expressly of the birth of prāṇa, manas, and all the indriya-s from Brahman; or of ākāśa etc from Ātman. The use of the Ablative case indicating the source is quite clear there. If they are yet placed in the same vibhakti, it can easily be made out that these - manas etc - are only unreal.

Sat, jīva, manas : how related
जनितत्वमवादि न हि श्रुतिभिःजनकेन सतास्य शरीरभृतः।
मनआदिविकारविलक्षणतांप्रतियन्ति शरीरभृतस्तु ततः ॥ 063 ॥

janitatvamavādi nahi śrutibhirjanakena satā'sya śarīrabhṛtaḥ ।
manaādivikāravilakṣaṇatāṁ pratiyanti śarīrabhṛtastu tataḥ ॥ 63 ॥
The Veda-s do not speak of the jīva as being born of the Sat, the father/the originator. It is thence that people realise the distinctness of the jīva from the vikṛti-s such as manas.

There is no Vedic passage speaking of the birth of the jīva from sat. On the contrary, there are passages that speak of the origination of mind etc from sat. It is this feature that enables the intelligent to differentiate between the jīva and manas etc.

Īkṣaṇa and praveśa
यदजीजनदम्बरपूर्वमिदंजगदक्षरमीक्षणविग्रहकम्।
प्रविवेश तदेव जगत्स्वकृतंस च जीवसमाख्य इति श्रुतयः ॥ 064 ॥

yadajījanadambarapūrvamidaṁ jagadakṣaramīkṣaṇavigrahakam ।
praviveśa tadeva jagatsvakṛtaṁ sa ca jīvasamākhya iti śrutayaḥ ॥ 64 ॥
With ākāśa as the first step, Brahman, the Imperishable, created the world; and beholding the same, entered the world It has created on its own - under the name of the jīva; so say the Veda-s.

The passages from AU and TU indicate the īkṣaṇa and the anupraveśa, the beholding and the entering. The latter is done under the label of the jīva.

Anupraveśa precludes vikāra
परमात्मविकारविविक्तमतिःन भवत्यत एव शरीरभृतः।
यत एव विकारविभिन्नमतिःन भवत्यत एव मृषात्वमतिः ॥ 065 ॥

paramātmavikāravibhaktamatirna bhavatyata eva śarīrabhṛtaḥ ।
yata eva vikāravibhinnamatirna bhavatyata eva mṛṣātvamatiḥ ॥ 65 ॥
It is for this reason that there is no idea formed about the jīva as the vikṛti of Paramātman. And for the very reason that the impression is not created that the jīva is not a vikṛti of Paramātman, nor is generated the idea that the jīva is untrue.

The basis for the confusion that the jīva is a vikṛti of Paramātman is their recurrence in the same vibhakti. But the issue of vikṛti does not figure at all in Vedic passages relating the jīva and the Paramātman. (On the other hand, it is said of other items discussed earlier that they are vikṛti-s).

When there is no talk of vikṛti, there can be no talk of the unreality of the jīva.

Analogy of “Water is salt(y)
अविभक्तविभक्त्यभिधानकृतापरमात्मपदेन शरीरभृतः।
न भवेदिह तत्त्वमसिप्रभृतौलवणं जलमित्यभिधा तु यथा ॥ 066 ॥

avibhaktavibhaktyabhidhānakṛtā paramātmapadena śarīrabhṛtaḥ ।
na bhavediha tattvamasiprabhṛtau lavaṇaṁ jalamityabhidhāsu yathā ॥ 66 ॥
There is no difference in the case (vibhakti) of the two words or the jīva and the Paramātman in sentences like tat tvam asi; the case is not such as obtains in ‘lavaṇaṁ jalam”, “water is salt(y)”.

It was objected earlier that there are cases of samāna-vibhaktikatva, collocation, which are situations of gauṇa-prayoga or secondary usage (or extended construal). The instance quoted in this verse is also of a similar nature.

The Sanskrit sentence “jalam lavaṇaṁ” can translate to “the water is salt”, but in actual usage would mean “the water is salty”. We refer to jala as lavaṇa because the features of lavaṇa have permeated the water. Thus, lavaṇaṁ jalam is another example of gauṇa-prayoga.

Now, it should not be construed that some features of Paramātman are there similarly in the jīva too, and hence that it is also a case of gauṇa-prayoga. Also, when a primary usage, mukhya-prayoga itself, works fine, there is no need to summon, or suspect the presence of, a gauṇa-prayoga.

Hence there is no extension of meaning. No Secondary Sense needs to be invoked here.

Denial of vikāra: its implication
परमात्मविकारनिराकरणंकृतमस्य शरीरभृतस्तु यतः।
परमेश्वररूपविलक्षणतान मनागपि देहभृतोऽस्ति ततः ॥ 067 ॥

paramātmavikāranirākaraṇaṁ kṛtamasya śarīrabhṛtastu yataḥ ।
parameśvararūpavilakṣaṇatā na manāgapi dehabhṛto'sti tataḥ ॥ 67 ॥
Thus has been denied the possibility of the jīva as any vikṛti of Paramātman. Consequently, there cannot be the slightest difference of the jīva from Paramātman.

The possibility of Secondary Construal has been logically dispensed with. What remains, therefore, is the fullest equation between the jīva and Paramātman.

Non-difference : if evident, why teach?
ननु जीवसतोरणुमात्रमपिस्वगतं न विशेषणमस्ति यदा।
वद तत्त्वमसीति तदा वचनंकिमु वक्ति तथैष त इत्यपि च ॥ 068 ॥

nanu jīvasatoraṇumātramapi svagataṁ na viśeṣaṇamasti yadā ।
vada tattvamasīti tadā vacanaṁ kimu vakti tathaiṣa ta ityapi ca ॥ 68 ॥
If it is the case that there cannot be any internal difference/distinction between the jīva and the Sat (Brahman) even to the slightest extent, tell me then what indeed is asserted by the statement tat tvam asi, as too the statement eṣa ta antaryāmy amṛtaḥ.

The two statements noted above occur respectively in CU and BU. The objection now raised is - if it is clear that there is no difference whatsoever between the jīva and the Sat - as evident from the idea of anupraveśa as jīva by Brahman itself, where indeed is then the need to make the statements of the two Upaniṣad-s noted above?

The question then is : what is achieved by the Upaniṣadic statements - anew and different from what is already known - in respect of the identity of the two entities?

Minute difference is difference, too
स्वगतं यदि भेदकमिष्टमभूत्अणुमात्रमपीश्वरदेहभृतोः।
अपनेतुमशक्यमदोवचनैःअमुनास्य पृथक्त्वनिषेधपरैः ॥ 069 ॥

svagataṁ yadi bhedakamiṣṭamabhūdaṇumātramapīśvaradehabhṛtoḥ ।
apanetumaśakyamado vacanairamunā'sya pṛthaktvaniṣedhaparaiḥ ॥ 69 ॥
Were it the case that it was intended that there was even a minute internal difference between the jīva and Paramātman, it would just be impossible to dispel such differences by means of such sentences that seek to deny those differences.

The primary question to be asked is - whether even the minutest difference is intended at all. If it was, even if there are many sentences claiming the contrary, the differences just cannot be undone.

Guṇa : inalienable if innate
इह यस्य च यो गुण आत्मगतःस्वत एव न जातु भवेत्परतः।
वचनेन न तस्य निराकरणंक्रियते स गुणः सहजस्तु यतः ॥ 070 ॥

iha yasya ca yo guṇa ātmagataḥ svata eva na jātu bhavetparataḥ ।
vacanena na tasya nirākaraṇaṁ kriyate sa guṇaḥ sahajastu yataḥ ॥ 70 ॥
Such quality as is innate in a thing, and has not been acquired from a foreign source, can never be undone by means of some statement. For, it is an inherent feature.

Qualities can be inherent or contingent. Contingent features are not long standing. Features that are immanent on the other hand cannot just be wished away. Invoking special utterances cannot really help here. Verbal declarations just cannot do and undo intrinsic features.

Do statements alter content?
वचनं त्ववबोधकमेव यतःतत एव न वस्तुविपर्ययकृत्।
न हि वस्त्वपि शब्दवशात्प्रकृतिंप्रजहात्यनवस्थितिदोषभयात् ॥ 071 ॥

vacanaṁ tvavabodhakameva yatastata eva na vastuviparyayakṛt ।
ऩhi vastvapi śabdavaśātprakṛtiṁ prajahātyanavasthitidoṣabhayāt ॥ 71 ॥
Utterances can only be indicative [of features]. And for this very reason, they cannot effect alterations in the stuff. Nor can things undergo alteration merely on account of utterances - for then there will be no end whatsoever to the same.

Words have limits. They serve well in describing things. But mere words cannot alter the very basic nature of things described. What applies to ordinary utterances can apply to Vedic utterances also.

Things cannot change their own nature simply because there are utterances to the contrary. And this is also very easily discernible, for things cannot keep changing on counts of utterances issuing from different speakers. There is no end to the speakers and things cannot go on suiting themselves to their words.

If indeed they do, there would be a logical fallacy called Infinite Regression or anavasthādoṣa or simply anavasthiti. Here there would be a situation of regression that will never end. This goes against the very principle of logical definition of things. Things undergoing limitless variation can never be defined and cannot be logically handled, and ultimately can never be relied upon. Meaningless and endless regressions are naturally frowned upon in philosophical/ serious literature.

What applies to human utterances can also be predicated of Vedic utterances, Vedic passages do not seek or claim to alter the essential nature of things. Reality does not alter to conform to somebody’s utterances, and Vedic passages are not meant, after all, to bring about changes in the very nature of things and alter their attributes.

Superimposition nullified
यत एवमतो विषयस्य गुणंविषयेण सहात्मनि मूढधिया।
अधिरोपितमप्स्विव भूमिगुणंप्रतिषेधति तत्त्वमसीति वचः ॥ 072 ॥

yata evamato viṣayasya guṇaṁ viṣayeṇa sahātmani mūḍhadhiyā ।
adhiropitamapsviva bhūmiguṇaṁ pratiṣedhati tattvamasīti vacaḥ ॥ 72 ॥
The utterance tattvamasi blocks what has been superimposed by the dull-witted - of the guṇa of the viṣaya-s, the properties of the objects of sense, along with the very objects themselves in the ātman; this is like the superimposition of the feature of bhūmi in water.

In the Indian logical scheme, gandha or smell is the essential property of pṛthivī (or bhūmi) (or mud): gandhavatī pṛthivī is the definition given (in Tarka-saṅgraha). It is when some of the mud gets mixed in water that water gets the smell, whether good or bad. (And so with vāyu wind). But in common parlance, seldom do we, dullards, pay attention to this. We speak of water as fragrant (or otherwise), whereas what can be fragrant is the pṛthivī element in the water. Thus, there is a superimposition of fragrance on the water.

The objects of the sense organs are things we see/hear/taste/smell/touch. And the properties of these objects of the senses are, respectively, form/sound/taste/smell/touch. These are together superimposed on the self: viṣaya-s and viṣaya-guṇa-s are superimposed on the ātman. This superimposition is what men of mediocre intellect do.

The role of sentences like tattvamasi is, then, obviating this superimposition, adhiropa.

It was asked in the previous verse by the pūrvapakṣin as to what after all was the role of sentences like tattvamasi. The question is answered here.

No vidhi, No gauṇa/arthavāda usages
अत एव न दृष्टिविधानपरंगुणवादपरं च न तद्वचनम्।
स्तुतिवाद्यपि नैतदुपास्यतयाविधिरत्र न देहभृतोऽस्ति यतः ॥ 073 ॥

ata eva na dṛṣṭividhānaparaṁ guṇavādaparaṁ ca na tadvacanam ।
stutivādyapi naitadupāsyatayā vidhiratra na dehabhṛto'sti yataḥ ॥ 73 ॥
Hence it is that the sentence tattvamasi is neither one that prescribes a particular perception (dṛṣṭi): nor is it a sentence that gives rise to a Secondary Sense (guṇavāda); nor again one that is in praise of something (stuti) designed for upāsanā. For, after all, there is no vidhi (prescription) ordained here at all.

Verses 50, 51, and 52 promoted the views of the pūrvapakṣin, and the objections have all been met with squarely.

Reversal: Sat as akin to jīva ?
सत एव हि नाम जगत्प्रकृतेःउपधानवशादिह जीव इति।
अत एव हि जीवसतत्त्वकतांप्रकृतस्य सतः प्रतिपादयति ॥ 074 ॥

sata eva hi nāma jagatprakṛterupadhānavaśādiha jīva iti ।
ata eva na jīvasatattvakatāṁ prakṛtasya sataḥ pratipādayati ॥ 74 ॥
It is on account of the upādhi-s (adjuncts) that the Sat which is the source of the world begets the label viz. Jīva. And that is why in respect of sat, which is the matter being discussed, what is predicated is the similarity with the jīva.

This verse notes another objection raised by the pūrvapakṣin. Rather than comparing the jīva to the Brahman, it could well be a case of reversal: similarity with jīva is, then, predicated of the Brahman.

This objection is answered in the next verse.

The redundancy of speaking of aṇiman etc.
यदि जीवसतत्त्वकतां गमयेत्अणिमादिगुणस्य जगत्प्रकृतेः।
अणिमादिगुणोक्तिरतोऽस्य मृषायदि वास्य शरीरभृदात्मकता ॥ 075 ॥

yadi jīvasatattvakatāṁ gamayedaṇimādiguṇasya jagatprakṛteḥ ।
aṇimādiguṇoktikatā'sya mṛṣā yadi vā'sya śarīrabhṛdātmakatā ॥ 75 ॥
Should it be argued that comparison is being conveyed of the cause of the world viz. Brahman, which is endowed with guṇa-s or powers such as aṇiman etc., then such a statement of being endowed with these guṇa-s would all be just a waste; so too would it be a waste if it is posited that Brahman itself is possessed of the nature of the jīva.

The statement in respect of aṇiman as a feature of the ātman occurs in CU. If by a reversal of roles, it is argued that it is the similitude of Brahman with the jīva is what is being conveyed, then the very statement of Brahman being endowed with features like aṇiman etc would be a waste. Aṇiman stands for extreme subtlety.

It equally makes no sense to call Brahman as jīvātmaka.

The cause of births and deaths
न च संसृतिहेतुनिराकरणंकृतमस्य शरीरभृतोऽभिमतम्।
परमेश्वरमात्मतया ब्रुवतावचनेन च तत्त्वमसीत्यमुना ॥ 076 ॥

iha saṁsṛtihetunirākaraṇaṁ kṛtamasya śarīrabhṛto'bhimatam ।
parameśvaramātmatayā bruvatā vacanena ca tattvamasītyamunā ॥ 76 ॥
Should the statement tattvamasi speak of Brahman as [become] Ātman, then the denial of the cause of the cycle of births and deaths for the jīva would have been done in an agreeable manner.

A consequence of the reversal of roles by the pūrvapakṣin is presented here. That is to say, the consequence of presuming that the sentence tattvamasi construed as speaking of Brahman itself as becoming the jīva - is taken up here. It is stated that this would end up in an absurd situation.

The consequence of such an assertion fails to account in an agreeable manner for the refutation of the causes or the cycle of births and deaths for the jīva. This would amount, then, to postulating or representing Brahman as getting entangled in the fetters of saṁsāra. This is by no means a happy representation of the saṁśāric bondage of the jīva.

Start from the verb
त्वमसीति पदद्वयमेति युजांतदिति ध्वनिना सह तत्त्वमिति।
क्रियया सह नामपदं समियात्निरपेक्षमुपैत्यनया हि युजाम् ॥ 077 ॥

tvamasīti padadvayameti yujāṁ taditi dhvaninā saha tattvamiti ।
kriyayā saha nāmapadaṁ samiyānnirapekṣamupaityanayā hi yujām ॥ 77 ॥
Tvam and asi get conjoined together [first], and then get conjoined with tat [yielding tat tvam asi]. The noun gets aligned with the verb, and it gets conjoined without any dependence on any other [item in the sentence].

In the sentence under discussion, tvam and asi get linked first, and tat joins the two later. Tvam asi means “You are”. The natural question that follows viz. what you are - is answered by tat. On the other hand, it cannot be construed as being formed thus: tat asi, joined next by tvam. The verb is the central piece in a sentence, and the clue for the subject is given by the verbal form. What accords with asi is only tvam, as both are in the 2nd Person, madhyama-puruṣa.

What the pūrvapakṣin is trying to propose is an alignment of tat and asi, to which tvam is to be conjoined. This is a grammatical impossibility as the Upaniṣadic sentence is tat tvam asi, and no *tat tvam asti. The latter sentence alone can mean *”Brahman has become you”. But then, without tampering with the Upaniṣadic sentence itself, such a construal cannot be possible.

Primacy of the verb
न हि नामसहस्रमपि क्रिययारहितं किमपि प्रतिपादयति।
प्रतिपादकमेषु लिङादि भवेत्विहितादिमतेर्जनकं हि यतः ॥ 078 ॥

nahi nāmasahasramapi kriyayā rahitaṁ kimapi pratipādayati ।
pratipādakameṣu liṅādi bhavedvihitādimaterjanakaṁ hi yataḥ ॥ 78 ॥
Even a thousand nouns cannot convey any action if bereft of the verb. What conveys action is the suffix[es] such a liṅ; it is by them that senses like prescription are generated.

An assemblage of nouns, however vast or involved, can yield no sense that can indicate or inspire any action. The verb plays a pivotal role in a sentence. The verb denotes action, and suffixes like liṅ - which is to say the various lakāra terminations are added to the action word viz. the root.

The actions are given their final shape only by these tense/mood terminations.

The centrality of the verb is well-indicated here.

Asi goes with tvam; tat figures later
भगवानपि मध्यममेव यतोविनियच्छति युष्मदि नित्यमतः।
प्रथमं त्वमसीति पदे समित-श्चरमं त्वसिना समियात्तदिति ॥ 079 ॥

bhagavānapi madhyamameva yato viniyacchati yuṣmadi nityamataḥ ।
prathamaṁ tvamasīti pade samitaścaramaṁ tvasinā samiyāttaditi ॥ 79 ॥
The revered [sage Pāṇini] has also prescribed the Madhyama-puruṣa (2nd Person) for the root when [the Agent of the action] is yuṣmad; and this is inviolable. So then, it is tvam and asi that came together first, and only subsequently can tat align with asi.

Pāṇini’s Aṣṭādhyāyī prescribes the Second Person for the root when the Agent is indicated by the word “yuṣmad”, “you”. Tvam is the Nominative Singular of this noun. While asti is the 3rd Person (Prathama-puruṣa) singular form of ‘√as’, asi is the 2nd Personal form. Hence tvam and asi align first naturally. Tad can get aligned to the verb only later.

Had the root been asti, one could have said tat and asti align first, and tvam figures in the next step.

Interpolations ought not to violate elementary grammatical rules, especially.

“Tvam asi” needs a predicate
पुरुषोऽभिहितस्त्वमसीति यदाकिमसानि वदेति तदाभिमुखः।
श्रवणाय भवेदणिमादिगुणंसदिति प्रकृतं तदसीति वदेत् ॥ 080 ॥

puruṣo'bhihitastvamasīti yadā kimasāni vadeti tadā'bhimukhaḥ ।
śravaṇāya bhavedaṇimādiguṇaṁ saditi prakṛtaṁ tadasīti vadet ॥ 80 ॥
Told “Tvam asi”[“you are…]”, the man would ask “[yes,] what am I?” getting eager to listen to the same. It is then that the master would say, in accordance with what is pertinent viz the Sat, endowed with aṇiman etc, viz. tad asi “You are That”.

The verse reconstructs the Master-pupil dialogue. The teacher first says tvam asi and the pupil looks askance, and it is then that the teacher says tad asi.

When the teacher says “You are [indeed]...”, it strikes the pupil as a sentence of incomplete predication, and so he naturally looks at the teacher, looking forward to what fills and completes the sentence and the sense. It makes him articulate his expectation, and so he would ask “kim asāni, vada” “what am I, [please] tell [me]”. He thus looks expectantly at the teacher, and it is then that the Master replies.

Bearing in mind what is now pertinent, the teacher would say tad asi “you are That”. Tad refers to what is pertinent, and it is nothing but Brahman referred to by the label “Sat”, ever-abiding, as endowed with the guṇa-s viz aṇiman etc.

Tat tvam asi occurs in CU, 6.8.7. Earlier, (i.e. in 6.2.1 already, and even in the earlier portions of 6.8.7), there is a discussion of “Sat”. And therefore, the referent of the pronoun Tad is obviously Sat. Thus, if Tad=Sat, the equation implied now is tvam=sat. Hence Tat tvam asi = Sat tvam asi, You are Sat, the Brahman.

Sat not shown as of a class with jīva
त्वमिति ध्वनिनाभिहितस्य यतःतदिति श्रुतिवाच्यसदात्मकताम्।
अवदद्वचनं तत एव सतोन हि जीवसतत्त्वकतां वदति ॥ 081 ॥

tvamiti dhvaninā'bhihitasya yatastaditiśrutivācyasadātmakatām ।
avadadvacanaṁ tata eva sato nahi jīvasatattvakatāṁ vadati ॥ 81 ॥
Being of the nature of Sat - expressed by the Vedic statement - is spoken of in respect of the one stated/indicated by the sound “tvam”, you; and for this very reason, the statement cannot speak of Sat being of the self-same nature as the jīva.

Tat refers to what is of the nature of Sat as depicted in the Upaniṣadic statement. The sound Tvam indicates the jīva. Therefore, the statement is tvam tat, which means tvam sat. It cannot mean the reverse viz. that sat is of the nature of the jīva. Saying A is of the nature of B is different from saying B is of the nature of A.

The extroverted needs to be introverted
विषयाभिमुखानि शरीरभृतःस्वरसेन सदा करणानि यतः।
स्वकमेष न रूपमवैति ततःप्रतिबोध्यत एव ततो वचनैः ॥ 082 ॥

viṣayābhimukhāni (ṇi) śarīrabhṛtaḥ svarasena sadā karaṇāni yataḥ ।
svakameṣa na rūpamavaiti tataḥ pratibodhyata eva tato vacanaiḥ ॥ 82 ॥
The faculties of men (lit: living beings) are by natural inclination turned towards the objects of the senses. It is for this reason that one does not get to know one's own self. So it is that he is awakened by the Vedic statements.

All the faculties - especially the mind and the sense-organs (and following them, the motor organs too) have a natural proclivity towards objects of pleasure. Owing to this being a natural tendency, the mind does not turn inward. And that is the reason why there is no possibility of knowing one's own self on one’s own. It is for this reason that the Veda-s teach and awaken man to his true, original, nature.

Rein in the sense-horses
वचनं च पराञ्चिपुरःसरकंबहुवैदिकमत्र तथा स्मरणम्।
विषयेषु च नावमिवाम्भसि यत्मनसेन्द्रियरश्मिविनिग्रहवत् ॥ 083 ॥

vacanaṁ ca parāñcipuraḥsarakaṁ bahu vaidikamatra tathā smaraṇam ।
viṣayeṣu ca nāvamivāmbhasi yanmanasendriyaraśmivinigrahavat ॥ 83 ॥
There are a good many Vedic statements such as parāñci khāni..., and too, smṛti words such as vāyurnāvamivāmbhasi and manasaivendriyagrāmaṁ which speak of the regulation of sense organs with the reins of the mind. The reference is to KU 2.1.1 and BG 2.67 and 6.24.

The Upaniṣad says that Brahmā (more accurately Svayambhū, the "Self-created") pierced the sense organs from inside out. The BG says that (like unto the wind carrying the boat away, so do) objects of the sense organs divert the intellect of a person. There is also a reference to regulating the intellect with dhṛti (steadfastness) (BG 6.25).

Equational Assertions, several
इयता हि न देहभृतोऽस्ति भिदापरमात्मदृशेरिति वाच्यमिदम्।
स्थितिकाल इहापि च सृष्टिमुखेसदनन्यतया श्रुत एव यतः ॥ 084 ॥

iyatā hi na dehabhṛto'sti bhidā paramātmadṛśeriti vācyamidam ।
sthitikāla ihāpi ca sṛṣṭimukhe sadananyatayā śruta eṣa yataḥ ॥ 84 ॥
Merely on account of this much, it should not be claimed that there is no difference between the jīvātman (lit: the bearer of the body) and the seer-[in the form of] Paramātman. For the Veda-s also indicate the non-difference of the jīvātman from the Sat (=Paramātman) even during sthiti (maintenance of the world), as too at the point of commencement of sṛṣṭi (creation).

That there is no difference between the jīvātman (deha-bhṛt) and the Paramātman-Seer (paramātma-dṛś) can be asserted on the grounds stated above, no doubt. But there is further evidence too from the Vedic literature itself for this lack of difference between the two - as both during sthiti and sṛṣṭi : "Sat alone was, in the beginning" (sadeva saumya idam agra āsīt) (and other śruti-s).

Reminders not negatory
द्वयमप्यविरोधि शरीरभृतोवचनीयमिदं रघुनन्दनवत्।
उपदेशमपेक्ष्य सदात्ममतिःपरमात्मसतत्त्वकता च सदा ॥ 085 ॥

dvayamapyavirodhi śarīrabhṛto vacanīyamidaṁ raghunandanavat ।
upadeśamapekṣya sadā''tmamatiḥ paramātmasatattvakatā ca sadā ॥ 85 ॥
It must be said that the two are not contradictory in respect of the jīvātman - the knowledge that sat and the self are the same as dependent upon instruction [by a master] and being of the very nature of the Paramātman all the time; the example for this is that of Rāma.

In the Rāmāyaṇa Yuddha Kāṇḍa, a little before Sītā enters fire, Brahmā and other gods speak to Rāma, and remind Him of His true divinity, whereas Rāma Himself would say that he considered himself but a mortal, the son of Daśaratha.

Rāma knew his divinity, but pretended he was but a mortal. And He was promptly reminded by the gods. Thus, Rāma was the same Divine Principle prior to and subsequent to His being reminded by the gods.

In the case of ordinary human beings, they remain utterly ignorant of their divinity. The ignorance has to be dispelled by an ācārya (preceptor) through the upadeśa (instruction). Whereby the ignorance is removed. Being of a class with Paramātman is nevertheless the true fact about the jīva. The jīva has no knowledge of his identity with Paramātman; in the case of Rāma, he pretended this ignorance.

There is no contradiction, however, between being of a nature with Paramātman, and yet needing to be instructed or reminded of it.

No prescription of upāsanā of Sat
सदुपासनमस्य विधेयतयावचनस्य मम प्रतिभाति यतः।
अत एव न जीवसदात्मकतांप्रतिबोधयतीत्यवदत् तदसत् ॥ 086 ॥

sadupāsanamasya vidheyatayā vacanasya mama pratibhāti yataḥ ।
ata eva na jīvasadātmakatāṁ pratibodhayatītyavadattadasat ॥ 86 ॥
"It occurs to me that the statement pertaining to the upāsanā of Sat appears as something prescribed. And it is for this reason that I say that the Veda does not speak of the jīva as being of the nature of the sat." - So had he [the pūrvapakṣin] said; but that is not tenable.

The statement of the pūrvapakṣin is taken up here once again.

He had stated that the statement "tattvamasi" appears like a vidhi-vākya. Upāsanā-vākya-s are such statements of injunction. If that is indeed so, then there can be no true equation between the jīvātman and Paramātman. For, whatever comes as a vidhi-vākya speaks of a becoming rather than a being.

The author says that that is not the case. In the next few verses also, there is a response to this very question.

Assertion is no prescription
सदुपास्व इति श्रुतिरत्र न तेतदसि त्वमिति श्रुतिरेवमियम्।
यत एवमतो न विधित्सिततासदुपासनकर्मण इत्यमृषा ॥ 087 ॥

sadupāsya iti śrutiratra na na te tadasi tvamiti śrutirevamiyam ।
yata evamato na vidhitsitatā sadupāsanakarmaṇa ityamṛṣā ॥ 87 ॥
There is no Vedic passage for you that says "Do the upāsanā of Sat"; on the other hand this Vedic passage says "that you are". As this is the case, it is not false that nothing is enjoined (vidhitsitatā) of the act viz. the upāsanā of Sat.

A perusal of the pattern of wording of the Vedic passages clarifies the issue. It would have indeed been an ordinance, had the seeker being asked to do the upāsanā of Sat; on the other hand, the wordings are to the effect that You are That. Therefore, it is no false claim that there is no vidhi here.

There is no verb like upāsva. The verb is only asi.

Injunctions cannot be imported
यदि तस्य कुतश्चिदिहानयनंक्रियते तदनर्थकमेव भवेत्।
पुरुषेण कृतस्य यतः श्रुतितान भवेदिति वेदविदां स्मरणम् ॥ 088 ॥

yadi tasya kutaścidihā''nayanaṁ kriyate tadanarthakameva bhavet ।
puruṣeṇa kṛtasya yataḥ śrutitā na bhavediti vedavidāṁ smaraṇam ॥ 88 ॥
It would be futile to bring such a word extraneously; for, as knowers of the Veda-s declare, it would cease to be Veda where there is human construction.

The issue is that in the interpretation of sentences, many times, we supply words as "understood", or as needed for completion of sense – as adhyāhāra, for example. But the problem is, such extraneous additions disqualify the text from being called the Veda. In other words, Veda is apauruṣeya, one that betrays no human hand.

Plain statements need no importation
किमरे! पुरुषं प्रतिबोधयितुंस्वकमर्थमशक्तमिदं वचनम्।
यदतोऽन्यत आनयनं क्रियतेभवता श्रवणेन विनापि विधेः ॥ 089 ॥

kimare puruṣaṁ pratibodhayituṁ svakamarthamaśaktamidaṁ vacanam ।
yadato'nyata ānayanaṁ kriyate bhavatā śravaṇena vinā'pi vidheḥ ॥ 89 ॥
Hello! Is this [Vedic] statement incapable of teaching its own sense to the seeker? For, you are bringing in from elsewhere an injunctory statement even though it is not found [in the original]!

There can be scope for supply of words from elsewhere only when the given sentence falls short of a complete sense. Does the sentence "tat tvam asi" sound incomplete that it requires an importation of an external word? You are thus importing a word expressive of vidhi when there is indeed no sanction for the same.

Twin flaws
श्रुतहानिरिहाश्रुतकॢप्तिरपिश्रुतिवित्समयो न भवेत्तु यतः।
श्रुतिभक्तिमता श्रुतिवक्त्रगतंग्रहणीयमतो न तु बुद्धिवशात् ॥ 090 ॥

śrutahānirihāśrutaklṛptirapi śrutivitsamayo na bhavettu yataḥ ।
śrutibhaktimatā śrutivaktṛgataṁ grahaṇīyamato na tu buddhivaśāt ॥ 90 ॥
That would imply forsaking what is stated, and invoking what has not been stated. This is at variance with the norms harboured by Vedic scholars. He who claims to respect the Veda-s has to be receptive to what is expressly stated in the Veda-s, and should not conjure words with his own intelligence.

Tat tvam asi - is a straightforward statement. Should one try to import an extraneous word it will implicate one with double fault - first, of disbanding what is provided (called śruta-hāni) and the other, of annexing or devising an extraneous expression (called aśruta-kalpanā).

Hence there is no upāsanā in the given verse.

Misidentification disastrous
पुरुषस्य शरीरगतात्ममतिंमृतिसम्भवहेतुमनर्थकरीम्।
अपनीय सदात्ममतिं दधतीमहते पुरुषस्य हिताय भवेत् ॥ 091 ॥

puruṣamya śarīragatātmamatiṁ mṛtisambhavahetumanarthakarīm ।
apanīya sadātmamatiṁ dadhatī mahate puruṣasya hitāya bhavet ॥ 91 ॥
This conduces to great wellbeing, by way of imparting the idea that his self is the Sat; and this, via dispelling first his [mis-]identification of himself with his body - which is disastrous and is the cause of [the series of] his deaths and births.

Everyone instinctively identifies himself with his body. This is perilous and is indeed the root cause for the cycle of births and deaths which is endless. And it is this that must first be dispensed and done away with.

It is the Vedic statement that bestows upon one the conviction that his self is no different from Sat. It is this that can conduce to the welfare of the person.

Wrong notion reversed
विनिवर्तत एव शरीरगताविपरीतमतिः पुरुषस्य तदा।
वचनेन तु तत्त्वमसीति यदाप्रतिबोध्यत एष त इत्यपि च ॥ 092 ॥

vinivartata eva śarīragatā viparītamatiḥ puruṣasya tadā ।
vacanena tu tattvamasīti yadā pratibodhyata eṣa ta ityapi ca ॥ 92 ॥
The pervert conviction ingrained in the body [that it is his true self] regresses - through the statement tat tvam asi; and it is then that he is enlightened by the same; as too by the statement "eṣa ta".

Apart from "tat tvam asi", there is the statement "eṣa te antaryāmyamṛtaḥ" from BU (3.7.3).

Both the statements indicate the true nature of the self. But for this enlightenment, everyone would continue to have an opposite perception – viz. that he is, after all, the body.

Undispelled delusion
यदि नापनयेच्छुतिरात्ममतिंपुरुषस्य शरीरगतामनृताम्।
तदहंमतिहेतुककर्मगतिंसुखदुःखफलामवशोऽनुभवेत् ॥ 093 ॥

yadi nāpanayecchrutirātmamatiṁ puruṣasya śarīragatāmanṛtām ।
tadahaṁmatihetukakarmagatiṁ sukhaduḥkhaphalāmavaśo'nubhavet ॥ 93 ॥
Should the Veda not dispel the false identification with the body, the individual will helplessly undergo joys and sorrows, the fruits of karman, the cause of which is ahaṅkāra.

With the wrong conflation of the self with the body, there ensues ahaṅkāra which spells karman-s which result in joys and sorrows - all of which one has to suffer all along. Thus, the flow of karman has its roots in ahaṅkāra, and its fruits in sukha and duḥkha. One has to undergo these invariably, and there is no help.

The only help is the Vedic statement that reveals what the true nature of the self is.

Upāsanā v/s revelation
यदि तत्त्वमसीति वदेद्वचनंसदुपासनकर्म न तत्त्वमिति।
पुरुषस्य फलं सदुपासनतोविमृशामि भविष्यति कीदृगिति ॥ 094 ॥

yadi tattvamasīti vadedvacanaṁ sadupāsanakarma na tattvamatim ।
puruṣasya phalaṁ sadupāsanato vimṛśāmi bhaviṣyati kīdṛgiti ॥ 94 ॥
Suppose the passage "tattvamasi" teaches the upāsanā of Sat, and not "You are Sat": of what sort would the fruit be of such an upāsanā of Sat is what I would now consider.

Granting the stand of the pūrvapakṣin that "tat tvam asi" teaches the act viz the upāsanā of Sat, the author proposes to reflect upon the possible consequences. He knows of course that the stand taken by the pūrvapakṣin does not hold water, but by a temporary acceptance, he can show the unwelcome consequences such an assumption can lead to.

Intrinsic nature inalienable
पुरुषस्य तु मर्त्यगुणस्य भवेत्सदुपासनया न सदात्मकता।
न कथञ्चिदपि प्रजहाति यतःप्रकृतिं सहजामिह कश्चिदपि ॥ 095 ॥

puruṣasya tu martyaguṇasya bhavetsadupāsanayā na sadātmakatā ।
na kathañcidapi prajahāti yataḥ prakṛtiṁ sahajāmiha kaścidapi ॥ 95 ॥
Given his mortality, man does not acquire the nature of Sat by an upāsanā of Sat. After all, no being whosoever in the world forsakes his inborn nature, howsoever [the effort to the contrary be].

What is one's essential nature cannot be wished away, and cannot be extirpated even with extraordinary exertions. None can just give up or lose what is but his very nature.

Given this fact, it follows that any kind or amount of upāsanā cannot obliterate the fundamental nature of a person. Left to himself, man is born, lives for some time and dies, and the cycle repeats. The upāsanā or even Sat cannot fundamentally alter it if this is indeed his quintessential nature.

Upāsanā and the true nature
यदि देहभृदेष सदात्मकतांप्रगमिष्यति वै सदुपासनया।
न च हास्यति रूपमसौ हि निजंयत ऐक्यमतिर्न भवत्युभयोः ॥ 096 ॥

yadi dehabhṛdeṣa sadātmakatāṁ pragamiṣyati vai sadupāsanayā ।
na jihāsati rūpamasau na nijaṁ yata aikyagatirna bhavatyubhayoḥ ॥ 96 ॥
Should it be the case that the jīva does indeed attain the nature of Sat via the upāsanā of Sat, he yet does not relinquish his original form - for the reason that the two cannot have unanimity.

Granting once again that the embodied self does indeed become Brahman through its upāsanā, there is one consequence that shows contradiction. The “original form” referred to here is the cycle of births and death, which is as it were the inalienable characteristic of the jīva. The exact opposite is the characteristic of Sat. Consequently, the two cannot act in accord. Where there is a lapse and lacking in unanimity, there can be no true concord. The pulls are, in other words, in opposite directions.

Note: The defective readings na jahāsyati and na na hāsyati have been replaced by na ca hāsyati as done by Vidvān Ranganatha Sharma.

Alchemical example
रसविद्धमयः प्रकृतिं सहजांप्रविहाय यथा कनकत्वमियात्।
पुरुषोऽपि तथा सदुपासनयाप्रतिपत्स्यत एव सदात्मकताम् ॥ 097 ॥

rasaviddhamayaḥ prakṛtiṁ sahajāṁ pravihāya yathā kanakatvamiyāt ।
puruṣo'pi tathā sadupāsanayā pratipatsyata eva sadātmakatām ॥ 97 ॥
With the penetration of rasa (mercury), iron sheds its original nature and becomes gold. On identical lines, could not the jīva perform the upāsanā of Sat, and attain thereby the very nature of Sat?

The pūrvapakṣin offers the alchemical example. The addition of rasauṣadha transmutes iron into gold. When we have such an example, why should it not be conceded that with the upāsanā of Sat, there will be a transmuting effect of converting the self into Sat? This is the issue raised by the pūrvapakṣin.

Delusion of change
अयसोऽवयवानभिभूय रसःस्थितवाननलानुगृहीतिमनु।
कनकत्वमतिं जनयत्ययसिप्रतिपन्नमयो न तु काञ्चनताम् ॥ 098 ॥

ayaso'vayavānabhibhūya rasaḥ sthitavānanalānugṛhītimanu ।
kanakatvamatiṁ janayatyayasi pratipannamayo na tu kāñcanatām ॥ 98 ॥
Consequent to the impact (lit: favour) of fire, mercury stays overwhelming the iron-particles, and thereby generates the illusion of gold; but in matter of fact, iron will not have actually transformed into gold.

Alchemy is not indeed possible, but a delusion of the same is what is normally effected. The aureate sheen is merely on account of the overpowering of ferrous fragments by gold.

Coating not the same as the content
उदकावयवानभिभूय पयोरजतावयवांश्च यथा कनकम्।
विपरीतमतिं जनयत्युदकेरजते च तथायसि हेममतिम् ॥ 099 ॥

udakāvayavānabhibhūya payo rajatāvayavāṁśca yathā kanakam ।
viparītamatiṁ janayatyudake rajate ca tathā'yasi hemamatim ॥ 99 ॥
Prevailing over water particles, milk generates an opposite knowledge with regard to water; this is quite like gold manipulating silver particles and creating an illusion of gold in silver.

Add milk to water, and it no more looks like water; it looks all milk now. What exactly has happened? Milk has dominated the particles of water, and made it all appear like milk itself, overpowering, that is, the water particles.

So with gold coating on silver, or imparting the [look or] feel of gold upon iron.

Alien element drops out, finally
रसवीर्यविपाकविनाशमनुप्रविनश्यति काञ्चनताप्ययसः।
कृतकं हि न नित्यमिति प्रगतंसमवेतमवश्यमपैति यतः ॥ 100 ॥

rasavīryavipākavināśamanu pravinaśyati kāñcanatā'pyayasaḥ ।
kṛtakaṁ hi na nityamatipragataṁ samavetamavaśyamupaiti yataḥ ॥ 100 ॥
Even as the effectiveness of mercury on iron expires, the goldness of iron too vanishes [without trace]. It is accepted that what is artificial lasts not long. What happened to be united [extraneously] will exit necessarily.

What is artificial is impermanent. What is added from outside is not absorbed and just wears out. So it is with goldness upon iron, artificial hence not lasting long.

It could be no different with the nature of Paramātman if artificially imposed on the jīva.

Artificial acquisitions can only be ephemeral
अमृतत्वमसत्पुरुषाय यदिक्रियते सदुपासनया यजिवत्।
यजिकार्यवदन्तवदेव भवेत्कृतकस्य यतो विदिताऽध्रुवता ॥ 101 ॥

amṛtatvamasatpuruṣasya yadi kriyate sadupāsanayā yajivat ।
yajikāryavadantavadeva bhavetkṛtakasya yato viditā'dhruvatā ॥ 101 ॥
If, after the analogy of the sacrifice, immortality could be imparted to the jīvātman, then even immortality would be one that has an end in time, for, what is attained through action, it is known, cannot be permanent.

We have the typical statement svargakāmo yajeta - He who aspires for svarga (“heaven”) must perform yajña (“sacrifice”). All the same, it is known that the svarga is no permanent abode for anyone. As the BG says, “Having enjoyed svarga-loka, even as one’s merits cease, one enters the mortal world”. Thus, whatever is accomplished by yajña (or for that matter, by any action) is no everlasting fruit.

Now if we posit something akin to this, the result will have to be similar. In other words, the amṛtatva (“immortality”) supposed to be accomplished by the upāsanā of Sat would have to be impermanent too - which is a contradiction in terms.

Hence mokṣa is not what is attained via upāsanā, nor akin to what is earned through yajña.

Incongruent elements cannot merge
पुरुषस्य सतश्च विधर्मकयोःसदुपासनया न भवेत् समितिः।
यदि सङ्गतिरिष्यत एव तयोर्अवियुक्ततया न चिरं वसतः ॥ 102 ॥

puruṣasya sataśca vidharmakayoḥ sadupāsanayā na bhavetsamitiḥ ।
yadi saṅgatiriṣyata eva tayoravimuktatayā na ciraṁ vasataḥ ॥ 102 ॥
Different in nature, the jīva and the Sat cannot be united. Even if they should so unite, not for long will they dwell unseparated.

If the jīva and the Sat are essentially different in nature, their communion cannot indeed happen at all. And even if such a union comes about, it can only be short lived. Essentially different entities cannot be expected to share company for too long. Kindred entities alone can have comradeship.

What scholars do not commend
फलमीदृगिदं सदुपासनतःपुरुषस्य भविष्यति नान्यदतः।
न च तन्निरवद्यतयाभिमतंविदुषां बहुदोषसमीक्षणतः ॥ 103 ॥

phalamīdṛgidaṁ sadupāsanataḥ puruṣasya bhaviṣyati nānyadataḥ ।
na ca tanniravadyatayā'bhimataṁ viduṣāṁ bahudoṣasamīkṣaṇataḥ ॥ 103 ॥
It is only such a fruit that can result from any upāsanā of the Sat; no fruit else can be possible. This is not commended as flawless by scholars as they have come to notice numerous flaws.

If one pursues the upāsanā of the Sat, it is only natural that its results are ephemeral. It can be no different.

Abounding as it does in drawbacks, it is not endorsed by the intellectual elite.

Indiscretion negated
सदुपासनकर्मविधानपरंन भवेदत एव हि सद्वचनम्।
अहमस्मि शरीरमिदं च ममे-त्यविवेकमतिं विनिवर्तयति ॥ 104 ॥

sadupāsanakarmavidhānaparaṁ na bhavedata eva hi tadvacanam ।
ahamasmi śarīramidaṁ ca mametyavivekamatiṁ vinivartayati ॥ 104 ॥
For this very reason, the passage pertaining to the Sat cannot promote any upāsanā-karma (“act of worship”) of the Sat. [Quite on the other hand], it dispels the indiscriminate notion viz “I am the body” or “this body is mine”.

For reasons stated in the previous verses, the statement tat tvam asi can in no wise be taken as advocating any upāsanā. Its role, on the other hand, is to nullify indiscretion. Indiscretion shows itself in two manners - of equating oneself with the body, and declaring it as his property. Errors in perceptions - of one’s own identity and of ownership - trouble all.

It is the errors in designating the “I” and the “mine” that are the root cause of bondage.

Collocatory utterances
सकलोपनिषत्सु शरीरभृतःपरमात्मपदैकविभक्तितया।
उपदेशवचांस्यनयैव दिशागमयेन्मतिमानभियुक्ततया ॥ 105 ॥

sakalopaniṣatsu śarīrabhṛtaḥ paramātmapadaikavibhaktitayā ।
upadeśavacāṁsyanayaiva diśā gamayenmatimānabhiyuktatayā ॥ 105 ॥
In all of the Upaniṣad-s, the intelligent student should interpret in this very fashion. All utterances of upadeśa (teaching) that present the jīva in the same grammatical case as Paramātman are presented.

There are several statements in the Upaniṣadic literature that present the jīva and the Paramātman in the same grammatical case. And in all such cases the wise interpreter should steer his interpretation solely on the above lines.

The prince who thought he was a hunter
द्रविडोऽपि च तत्त्वमसीति वचोविनिवर्तकमेव निरूपितवान्।
शबरेण विवर्धितराजशिशोर्निजजन्मविदुक्तिनिदर्शनतः ॥ 106 ॥

draviḍo'pi ca tattvamasīti vaco vinivartakameva nirūpitavān ।
śabareṇa vivardhitarājaśiśornijajanmaviduktinidarśanataḥ ॥ 106 ॥
Even Draviḍa has interpreted the statement tat tvam asi as preclusive in its role, via the illustration of - the statement of the person who knew the details of birth to [an actual] prince who happened to be reared by but a hunter.

The verse recalls the example of a prince who even as a child lost his parents, and was brought up by a hunter by a strange conspiracy of circumstances, and the prince grew up believing he was only a hunter. But there was one person who knew the details of the birth of the very prince. When he laid bare the details, the revelation led to the instant realisation of the prince as to who he in reality was.

Shed the delusion
यत एवमतः स्वशरीरगता-महमित्यविवेकमतिं सुदृढाम्।
प्रविहाय यदक्षरमद्वयकंत्वमवेहि तदक्षरमात्मतया ॥ 107 ॥

yata evamataḥ svaśarīragatāmahamityavivekamatiṁ sudṛḍhām ।
pravihāya yadakṣaramadvayakaṁ tmamavehi tadakṣaramātmatayā ॥ 107 ॥
As things are such, abandon the very firm indiscrete notion of the "I" enveloping the body; and get to know that the [true] self is that secondless imperishable Principle.

On grounds stated above, dispel the delusion that animates the firm wrong equation of your self with your body. After divesting yourself of the wrong notion, get to know what is the correct idea viz. the true nature. The true nature of the self is the secondless principle which is imperishable.

High abode: beyond Prakṛtic entities
न मनो न मतिः करणानि च नोन रजो न तमो न च सत्त्वमपि।
न मही न जलं न च वह्निरपिश्वसनो न नभश्च पदं परमम् ॥ 108 ॥

na mano na matiḥ karaṇāni ca no na rajo na tamo na ca sattvamapi ।
na mahī na jalaṁ na ca vahnirapi śvasano na nabhaśca padaṁ paramam ॥ 108 ॥
That high abode is no mind, no intellect, nor the sense organs; it is not rajas, tamas, or sattva; it is not the Earth, the Water or the Fire, nor Wind nor Ether.

The Imperishable Principle is not to be equated with any of the five Elements; nor with the guṇa-s of Prakṛti viz. sattva, rajas, or tamas; nor with the various faculties viz. manas or buddhi or the indriya-s.

In other words, none of the evolutes of Prakṛti can be equated with the Imperishable Principle.

Know the Beyond as the Self
अमनस्कमधीकमनिन्द्रियकंविरजस्कमसत्त्वतमस्कमपि।
अमहीजलवह्न्यनिलाम्बरकंपरमक्षरमात्मतयाश्रय भोः ॥ 109 ॥

amanaskamabuddhimanindriyakamarajaskamasattvatamaskamapi ।
amahījalavahnyanilāmbarakaṁ paramakṣaramātmatayā''śraya bhoḥ ॥ 109 ॥
Take resort to the Imperishable Supreme as the True Self - that which is devoid of manas, buddhi, and the indriya-s; that which is devoid of rajas, tamas, or sattva; and that which is devoid of Earth, Water, Fire, and Wind, and Ether.

The deathless Supreme is beyond the three antaḥkaraṇa-s; beyond the three guṇa-s of Prakṛti; and divested of the Five Elements viz. the Earth, the Water, the Fire, and the Wind, and the Ether.

The Wakeful State
करणानि हि यद्विषयाभिमुखंप्रगमय्य मतिर्विषयेषु चरेत्।
तदु जागरितं प्रवदन्ति बुधाःन तदस्ति ममेत्यवगच्छ दृशे ॥ 110 ॥

karaṇāni hi yadviṣayābhimukhaṁ pragamayya matirviṣayeṣu caret ।
tadu jāgaritaṁ pravadanti budhā na tadasti mametyavagaccha dṛśeḥ ॥ 110 ॥
Wise men designate this indeed as the wakeful state, where the intellect moves about in the realm of those objects, impelling the faculties (sense organs) towards the sensual objects. Understand that this does not pertain to me, O seer.

The cause of illusion is the disorientation of “I” and “mine”. Rectificatory measures are suggested here: Discern as to whether it pertains to the true you.

All identify themselves with what they do in the wakeful state. What happens in this state is that the sense organs are directed towards the sensual objects. It is the intellect that directs these organs to so function. The intellect moves about in the field of the sensual objects deploying the sense organs.

All this, then, is what the intellect is bringing about, and therefore cannot be identified as mine by the self.

The Dream State
करणानि यदोपरतानि तदाविषयानुभवाहितवासनया।
विषयेण विना विषयप्रतिमंस्फुरणं स्वपनं प्रवदन्ति बुधाः ॥ 111 ॥

karaṇāni yadoparatāni tadā viṣayānubhavāhitavāsanayā ।
viṣayeṇa vinā viṣayapratimaṁ sphuraṇaṁ svapanaṁ pravadanti budhāḥ ॥ 111 ॥
When the sense organs recede, there occur flashes comparable to those that arise from the sense organs in spite of the very absence of their objects, and this happens on account of the vāsanā-s (“impressions”) deposited by the experience of the objects. Wise men call this the dream.

The experience of sensual pleasures naturally presupposes the existence and presence of the sensual objects within the reach of the sense organs of the individual. But there are situations where the experience is as of the sensual objects but in spite of the absence, mysteriously, of the function of the very sense organs.

And this happens on account of the vāsanā-s ("impressions") deposited by the sensual objects.

This kind of experience despite the cessation of the sense organs is what the wise designate as svapana [or svapna] ("dream"). The experience of the objects when the very means of apprehension of the objects has ceased operation is the state of dream being described here.

What accounts for this peculiar experience - of the objects even though the very channels of sensation are withdrawn from functioning - is the mass of impressions created by earlier experiences.

This state is called the dream state.

The Deep Sleep State
करणस्य धियः स्फुरणेन विनाविषयाकृतिकेन तु या स्थितता।
प्रवदन्ति सुषुप्तिममूं हि बुधाविनिवृत्ततृषः श्रुतितत्त्वविदः ॥ 112 ॥

karaṇasya dhiyaḥ sphuraṇena vinā viṣayākṛtikena tu yā sthitatā ।
pravadanti suṣuptimamūṁ hi budhā vinivṛttatṛṣaḥ śrutitattvavidaḥ ॥ 112 ॥
Wise men, whose desires have ceased and who know the truth of the Veda-s, declare this as suṣupti (“deep sleep”) viz. the stationing of the intellect without the experience of assumption of the shape of the objects by the [mental] faculty.

This state of deep sleep is characterised by these features. The intellect stands still; and the mind does not assume the shape of any object. Men who have mastered the essence of the Veda-s and are themselves free of desires have given this label to this state.

Beyond the three states
इति जागरितं स्वपनं च धियःक्रमतोऽक्रमतश्च सुषुप्तिरपि।
न कदाचिदपि त्रयमस्ति ममे-त्यवगच्छ सदास्मि तुरीयमिति ॥ 113 ॥

iti jāgaritaṁ svapanaṁ ca dhiyaḥ kramato'kramataśca suṣuptamapi ।
na kadācidapi trayamasti mametyavagaccha tadā'smi turīyamiti ॥ 113 ॥
Understand that the three states - viz. the wakeful, the dream, and deep sleep appearing in this [regular] order or in irregular sequences - belong to the intellect, and not to you; and that you are always Turīya [the Fourth].

We are constantly alternating between the states of the wakeful, the dream, and deep sleep. Sometimes they appear in this very order, and sometimes they occur in very different orders.

Howsoever be the sequence, this procession of states belongs to the intellect, and not to myself. I am very different, being just the Turīya all the time. This is what one needs to realise.

Label dependent on other labels
यदु जागरितप्रभृति त्रितयंपरिकल्पितमात्मनि मूढधिया।
अभिधानमिदं तदपेक्ष्य भवेत्परमात्मपदस्य तुरीयमिति ॥ 114 ॥

yadu jāgaritaprabhṛtitritayaṁ parikalpitamātmani mūḍhadhiyā ।
abhidhānamidaṁ tadapekṣya bhavetparamātmapadasya turīyamiti ॥ 114 ॥
This label as the Fourth [Turīya] for the abode of Paramātman is only relative to what has been imagined by a dullard as comprising a trinity viz. jāgarita ("wakeful") etc.

Paramātman has been labelled the Turīya. The genesis of this label can only be against the background of the three states. The three are wakeful etc. What must be noted is that the three are conjured by someone of a dull mind. After all, there can be no fourth if there are no prior three states.

Analogy of the Sculpted Elephant
यदपेक्ष्य भवेदभिधानमिदंपरमात्मपदस्य तुरीयमिति।
तदसत्यमसत्यगुणश्च ततःपरिनिर्मितवारणचेष्टितवत् ॥ 115 ॥

yadapekṣya bhavedabhidhānamidaṁ paramātmapadasya turīyamiti ।
tadasatyamasatyaguṇaśca tataḥ parinirmitavāraṇaceṣṭitavat ॥ 115 ॥
False it is, and its characteristics unreal - based on which the label Turīya is assigned to the abode of Paramātman – [all] akin to the "actions" of an elephant but sculpted.

The sculpture of an elephant may well betray the emotions of an elephant; all the same none of the characteristics or actions of a real elephant can be evinced there. Neither is there the real elephant, nor are there the typical stirrings, actions and movements of a real elephant.

So it is with the label Turīya for Paramātman or for His abode. Turīya is a relative term issuing from the reckoning of the three states. These three themselves have no foundation in reality, nor hence, their attributes.

Examples to show what is not
गगनप्रमुखं पृथिवीचरमंविषयेन्द्रियबुद्धिमनःसहितम्।
जनिमज्जगदेतदभूतमितिश्रुतयः प्रवदन्त्युपमानशतैः ॥ 116 ॥

gaganapramukhaṁ pṛthivīcaramaṁ viṣayendriyabuddhimanaḥsahitam ।
janimajjagadetadabhūtamiti śrutayaḥ pravadantyupamānaśataiḥ ॥ 116 ॥
This created world - commencing with ākāśa (“Ether”) and ending with pṛthivī (“Earth”) and comprising the sensual objects and the sense organs as too accompanied by intellect and mind - is unreal; so do the Vedic passages declare with hundreds of similes.

The world we experience consists of the five bhūta-s (“Elements”) that start from ākāśa and end with pṛthivī and consists of the objects that our senses run after. And the same five are the constituents of our body and our sense organs. The other components that the world encompasses are our manas and buddhi, mind and intellect.

All these are born at a point of time; whatever has birth at some point of time is not going to be everlasting. And whatever lasts not forever is untrue, too. The Veda-s themselves declare this truth through centuries of comparisons.

Triples sustain the body and the world
कफपित्तसमीरणधातुधृतंकुशरीरमिदं सततं हि यथा।
प्रभवप्रभृतिप्रलयान्तमिदंजगदग्निरवीन्दुधृतं हि तथा ॥ 117 ॥

kaphapittasamīraṇadhātudhṛtaṁ kuśarīramidaṁ satataṁ hi yathā ।
prabhavaprabhṛti pralayāntamidaṁ jagadagniravīndudhṛtaṁ hi tathā ॥ 117 ॥
This contemptible body is continuously supported by the dhātu-s ("Elements") viz kapha, pitta and vāyu ("Phlegm, Bile and Wind"); even so this world, from its origination till dissolution is supported by Agni, Sūrya, and Candra ("Fire", "Sun", and "Moon").

A trinity of dhātu-s sustain the body. Even so, a trinity of luminaries support the world. There is thus a parallelism between the microcosm and the macrocosm.

Corroborating realms
जगतः स्थितिकारणमित्थमिदंप्रथितं रविवह्निशशित्रितयम्।
स्मृतिवेदजनेषु भृशं प्रथितंश्रुतिरीरितवत्यनृतं तदिति ॥ 118 ॥

jagataḥ sthitikāraṇamitthamidaṁ prathitaṁ ravivahniśaśitritayam ।
smṛtivedajaneṣu bhṛśaṁ yaditi śrutirīritavatyanṛnaṁ taditi ॥ 118 ॥
In this manner, the trinity of the Sun, the Fire, and the Moon is famed to be responsible for the sustenance of the world. And this is very well known in the smṛti-s, in the Veda-s, and [even among] the lay. And the Veda-s have stated that it [the trinity] is unreal.

The Sun, the Fire, and the Moon are reputed to be responsible for the sustenance of the world. And this is discernible from śruti-s and smṛti-s (the Veda-s and texts on Dharmaśāstra); knowledgeable men know this; and it is not unknown to the ordinary folk.

All the same, the Veda-s have indicated that this trinity of luminaries is unreal, after all (which is to say, not destined to be permanent).

What people presume, what the truth is
यदु रोहितशुक्लसुकृष्णमिदंज्वलनादिषु रूपमवैति जनः।
तदु तैजसमाप्यमथान्नमितिब्रुवती त्रयमेव तु सत्यमिति ॥ 119 ॥

yadu rohitaśuklasukṛṣṇāmidaṁ jvalanādiṣu rūpamavaiti janaḥ ।
tadu taijasamāpyamathānnamiti bruvatī trayameva tu satyamiti ॥ 119 ॥
People discern the red, the white, and the dark form in fire etc ; all that, the Veda-s say, is nothing but what issues from tejas, ap and anna (the Fire, the Water and food), and that it is these [latter] three that are true.

The reference here is to CU 6.4.1. It refers to the trinity of pigments in fire viz. the red, the white, and the black, and traces them respectively to tejas, ap, and anna. It is the latter trinity that is responsible for the creation of Fire; and by a continuation of the same logic, for the creation of everything in the universe. It is only these, then, that are abiding and hence real.

Labels go after appearances
रुचकप्रमुखं कनकादिमयंरुचकाद्यभिधाननिमित्तमपि।
असदित्यवगम्यत एव यतोव्यभिचारवती रुचकादिमतिः ॥ 120 ॥

rucakapramukhaṁ kanakādimayaṁ rucakādyabhidhānanimittamiti ।
asadityavagamyata eva yato vyabhicāravatī rucakādimatiḥ ॥ 120 ॥
Rucaka (an ornament) etc. are made of gold, and they constitute the reason for their label too. But they are all discerned to be just unreal, as the notion of rucaka etc. is subject to variation.

Rucaka is a special ornament for the neck, resembling a pendant, and is usually made of gold. This ornament has a particular shape etc., and gets to be called Rucaka. Being made of gold is the cause of the label too.

Yet, we discern rucaka and such items to be unreal; for, rucaka as such is by no means permanent. The moment it is dissolved, it ceases to be rucaka, though it ceases not to be gold. What was first noted and labelled as rucaka is now identified as but gold. In other words, the rucaka-nature is anitya, and the gold-nature is not.

The apprehension that abides
न कदाचिदपि व्यभिचारवतीकनकादिमतिः पुरुषस्य यतः।
तत एव हि सत्यतयाभिमतंकनकादिविपर्यय एषु न हि ॥ 121 ॥

na kadācidapi vyabhicāravatī kanakādimatiḥ puruṣasya yataḥ ।
tata eva hi satyatayā'bhimataṁ kanakādi viparyaya eṣu nahi ॥ 121 ॥
For the perception of gold etc. [in rucaka etc.] is never hidden from anybody; and it is for this reason that it is commended as real; for, the goldness in them is never contradicted.

Seeing golden ornaments such as rucaka, one easily notices them as gold. Even if the ornaments are dissolved, they continue to be noticed as gold. Thus, the labels or the shapes come and go; but the essential goldness never leaves.

The gold is the cause, and rucaka is an effect. The gist, therefore, is that gold as such is abiding; but what is made out of gold does not necessarily last. In other words, the cause is abiding whereas the effect is not. And the purport of the argument is that the cause is permanent, the effect is impermanent, or rather unreal.

What applies to gold and products of gold applies equally well to things like copper and steel, and artefacts made out of them.

From analogy to fact
रुचकादिसमं ज्वलनादि भवेत्अनृतत्वगुणेन तु, सत्यतया।
अरुणप्रमुखं ज्वलनप्रभृति-प्रकृतित्रितयं कनकादिसमम् ॥ 122 ॥

rucakādisamaṁ jvalanādi bhavedanṛtatvaguṇena tu satyatayā ।
aruṇapramukhaṁ jvalanaprabhṛtiprakṛtitritayaṁ kanakādisamam ॥ 122 ॥
As is rucaka, so is agni, by virtue of being unreal. The red colour etc. - constituting the trinity of the material causes for fire etc. - are on par with gold, by virtue of being real.

The parallelism is drawn out in this verse. There is a trinity of material causes for the trinity of effects we see. The colours red, white and black are the material causes of tejas, ap, and anna, as seen earlier. And therefore, they are on par with gold which is the material cause of rucaka etc. Obviously, rucaka and similar items are on par with fire and similar items.

Prakṛti stands for the material cause. The same idea of the cause being real, and the effects being unreal is stated here via Upaniṣadic as well as commonplace examples.

The unreal gross and the subtle true
अनयोपमयानृततामवदत्श्रुतिरग्निदिवाकरचन्द्रमसाम्।
अमृषात्वमपि श्रुतिरुक्तवतीत्रितयस्य तु रक्तपुरःसरिणः ॥ 123 ॥

anayopamayā'nṛtatāmavadacchrutiragnidivākaracandramasām ।
amṛṣātvamapi śrutiruktavatī tritayasya tu raktapuraḥsariṇaḥ ॥ 123 ॥
Through this example, the Veda spoke of the unreality of Agni, Sūrya, and Candra; and the Veda spoke also of the non-unreality of the three commencing with red.

The Fire, the Sun, and the Moon are effects; hence unreal. Red, White, and Black are causes; hence real. The Vedic passage referred to here is the CU statement regarding the triple forms of fire.

The massive bodies viz. The Sun, the Moon and the Fire are effects, and ultimately unreal. The subtle fabrics red, white and black are causes, hence real.

The unreal vikṛti and the real Prakṛti
अनृतत्वमिदं ज्वलनप्रभृतेःयदवादि भवेत्तदुदाहारणम्।
वितथा विकृतिः सततं सकलान तथा प्रकृतिः श्रुतिनिश्चयतः ॥ 124 ॥

anṛtatvamidaṁ jvalanaprabhṛteryadavādi bhavettadudāharaṇam ।
vitathā vikṛtiḥ satataṁ sakalā na tathā prakṛtiḥ śrutiniścayataḥ ॥ 124 ॥
What was stated as the unreality of fire etc serves as an example: all vikṛti (effect) is always unreal; and Prakṛti (cause), not so. All this is as per the ascertainment issuing from the Veda.

The verse extends the cause-effect relation to all of Prakṛti and vikṛti. A sweep of generalization is effected by an example settled in the famed Vedic passage. The example offered by the Veda provides a prototype and a more comprehensive generalisation may confidently be stated owing to its firm foundation in the Veda.

Analysis: tool for discerning the truth
प्रदिदर्शयिषुर्वसनस्य यथावितथत्वमपास्यति तन्तुगुणम्।
अपकृष्य तु तन्तुसमं त्रितयंज्वलनप्रमुखस्य तथोक्तवती ॥ 125 ॥

pradidarśayiṣurvasanasya yathā vitathatvamapāsyati tantuguṇam ।
apakṛṣya tu tantusamaṁ tritayaṁ jvalanapramukhasya tathoktavatī ॥ 125 ॥
Just as he who intends to demonstrate the unreality of the cloth segregates the threads of the cloth, even so does the Veda speak of the isolation of the thread-like triad drawn out in respect of the fire etc.

The author says that the Veda is making an assertion which after all falls in line with what is done in the world. If someone wants to demonstrate that the cloth is unreal, as against the thread which is real, he just pulls out the thread and shows it. The trinity (viz. the red, the white and the black) is similarly drawn out in order to show the unreality of fire etc (i.e. fire, water, and food).

The Vedic statement which refers to the impermanence of the fire for example, is apāgād agneragnitvam "The fireness of fire has departed".

The visible untruth and the invisible truth
अवनिप्रमुखं वियदन्तमिदंविकृतिस्तु परस्य भवत्यपरम्।
अनृतं त्वपरं विकृतिस्तु यतोऽवितथं तु परं प्रकृतिस्तु यतः ॥ 126 ॥

avanipramukhaṁ viyadantamidaṁ vikṛtistu parasya bhavatyaparam ।
anṛtaṁ tvaparaṁ vikṛtistu yato'vitathaṁ tu paraṁ prakṛtistu yataḥ ॥ 126 ॥
Starting from pṛthivī ("Earth") upto ākāśa ("Ether") is all vikṛti (effect/transformation), being the apara (the inferior) aspect of Paramātman who is para (the Superior) aspect. What is apara is unreal - owing to being a vikṛti; on the other hand, the para is the real - owing to being the Prakṛti.

The first quarter of the verse refers to the five mahābhūta-s. The grossest of them is pṛthivī and the subtlest of them is ākāśa. Nothing material escapes from this "net" of the earth to the ether". All this constitutes what is called aparā-prakṛti or the lower form of the Supreme Brahman. And what is apara is, in fine, unreal - the reason being, all that is vikṛti is unreal.

In vivid contrast is the parā-prakṛti of Paramātman. Being para, it is by no means unreal, for it constitutes the prakṛti of the universes.

The uncreate real, and the create unreal
अत एतदसेधि सदुक्ति परंन मृषेति मृषा तु ततोऽन्यदिति।
इति सिद्धमतो यदवादि मयाजनिमज्जगदेतदभूतमिति ॥ 127 ॥

ata etadasedhi sadukti paraṁ na mṛṣeti mṛṣā tu tato'nyaditi ।
iti siddhamato yadavādi mayā janimajjagadetadabhūtamiti ॥ 127 ॥
Hence has this been established as para, what has been stated as sat – which is by no means unreal; and all else is unreal. What had been stated by me - viz. that this world, which has had its birth, is not real - is now proven.

The aforesaid illustrations, argumentations and invocations of Vedic statements - all go to prove but one thing viz. that the Para, stated as Sat is by no means unreal; and equally, all else is unreal. Further, it now stands proven that this world too is but a product, an entity that has come into being at some point of time, and hence is unreal.

Thus has it been shown that Brahman is real, and the universe is unreal.

Mind as similarly unreal
मनसोऽप्यनृतत्वमसेध्यमुतःप्रतिपादितहेतुत एव भवेत्।
चरितं च तदीयमसत्यमतःपरिनिर्मितवारणचेष्टितवत् ॥ 128 ॥

manaso'pyanṛtatvamasedhyamutaḥ pratipāditahetuta eva bhavet ।
caritaṁ ca tadīyamasatyamataḥ parinirmitavāraṇaceṣṭitavat ॥ 128 ॥
And by this, the unreality of the mind also stands demonstrated by the self-same reasoning. And its function is therefore unreal, comparable to the actions of an elephant that has [only] been sculpted.

Manas or mind is a created entity, too. And going by the very arguments presented earlier, it follows that the unreality of the mind also stands clarified. If mind itself is unreal, the functions of the mind are unreal too, and are therefore comparable to the functions of the sculpted elephant. An elephant may be shown as menacingly advancing towards the foe, but in reality cannot stir, and does not even move an inch.

Hence the world is unreal and the mind is unreal too.

Is manas created too?
ननु नाभ्यवदच्छ्रुतिरुद्भवनंमनसस्तु सतो न च खप्रमुखात्।
कथमस्य भवेदनृतत्वगतिर्-मनसो भगवन् वद निश्चयतः ॥ 129 ॥

nanu nābhyavadacchrutirudbhavanaṁ manasastu sato na ca khapramukhāt ।
kathamasya bhavedanṛtatvagatirmanaso bhagavan vada niścayataḥ ॥ 129 ॥
"Revered Sir, the Veda-s have not stated that manas has been created by Brahman, nor out of ākāśa etc. How am I to comprehend the unreality of the mind then? Please explain this conclusively.

The Veda has not expressly stated the origination of the mind either from Sat, or from ākāśa etc. There is thus no express statement of the mind being born. If it had its birth, it could be either directly from Sat itself, or else from the five mahābhūta-s viz. ākāśa etc.

It was shown earlier that whatever is born is ultimately unreal, and if it has not been shown at all that mind was born, how am I to infer or conclude regarding the unreality of the mind?

The disciple is requesting the preceptor to clarify so that he may develop a proper conviction.

Manas and prāṇa spring together
ननु सप्तम आत्मन उद्भवनंमनसोऽभिदधावसुनापि सह।
कथमस्य भवेदमृषात्वगतिर्मनसो विकृतित्वगुणस्य वद ॥ 130 ॥

nanu saptama ātmana udbhavanaṁ manaso'bhidadhāvasunā'pi saha ।
kathamasya bhavedamṛtatvagatirmanaso vikṛtitvaguṇasya vada ॥ 130 ॥
In the Seventh chapter of the text, the Veda indeed speaks of the arising of manas, along with prāṇa, from ātman. Being something born, it has the characteristics of the vikāra. So you tell me how the mind comes to have the characteristics of something unreal?

At 7.26.1, CU states that the mind is born of ātman. Cf. ātmataḥ prāṇaḥ...ātmato manaḥ. This clarifies the issue. Born of ātman, mind is a product too, and hence shares the features of related items viz. being unreal.

The teacher now asks the student in turn, to tell him rather, how mind, which is a vikṛti, after all, can be shown as having no characteristic of being unreal.

The evidence of Muṇḍaka
असुना करणैर्गगनप्रमुखैःसह मुण्डक उद्भवनं मनसः।
पुरुषात् परमात्मन उक्तमतोवितथं मन इत्यवधारय भोः ॥ 131 ॥

asunā karaṇairgaganapramukhaiḥ saha muṇḍaka udbhavanaṁ manasaḥ ।
puruṣātparamātmana uktamato vitathaṁ mana ityavadhāraya bhoḥ ॥ 131 ॥
Along with prāṇa, along with all the sense organs and along with items like ākāśa etc., says MU, mind was born from Paramātman. And therefore, ascertain for yourself the unreality of mind, Oh disciple!

MU 1.2.3 speaks of the birth of manas along with prāṇa, as too all the indriya-s (sense organs), along with the elements starting with ākāśa - all issuing from Paramātman.

As there is an explicit statement of “the birth of the mind”, you can ascertain that the mind is unreal too.

Like the body, mind is material, too
मनसोऽन्नमयत्वमवादि यतःतत एव हि भूतमयत्वगतिः।
कुशरीरवदेव ततोऽपि भृशंवितथं मन इत्यवधारय भोः ॥ 132 ॥

manaso'nnamayatvamavādi yatastata eva hi bhūtamayatvagatiḥ ।
kuśarīravadeva tato'pi bhṛśaṁ vitathaṁ mana ityavadhāraya bhoḥ ॥ 132 ॥
On grounds of the fact that the mind has been spoken of as essentially of the nature of the food, it can be inferred therefrom itself of its essential activity as on par with the bhūta-s ("Elements") - exactly as it holds good with this wretched body. Thence too can you ascertain firmly (or even more so) that the mind is unreal.

It is evident from CU 6.5.1 and 6.5.4 that manas is annamaya: the mind is chiefly constituted of the food we eat; and that it is indeed the subtlest aspect of food that becomes the mind.

What can easily be inferred from this is that the mind is too a product of the food we eat; and this is kindred to what is even more evidently known viz. that the body is a product of the food we consume.

Being constituted of the five Elements, the body is deemed as contemptible. And the mind is now discernible as coplanar with the body, as both are products of the self-same food. Annamayatva and bhūtamayatva are kindred features: food is made of the Elements, and whatever entities issue from the consumption of food are materially and essentially not very different from it. As a consequence, the body and the mind are both products of food, and if one of the two is unreal, the other is unreal too, and for the same reason.

All this leads invariably to the conclusion that the mind is an unreal entity, as much as the body is.

The syllogistic frame
कुरु पक्षमिमं गगनप्रमुखंजनिमत् सकलं नहि सत्यमिति।
प्रथमं चरमं च न चास्ति यतोरुचकादिवदित्युपमां च वद ॥ 133 ॥

kuru pakṣamimaṁ gaganapramukhaṁ janimatsakalaṁ nahi satyamiti ।
prathamaṁ caramaṁ ca na cāsti yato rucakādivadityupamāṁ ca vada ॥ 133 ॥
Take up ākāśa etc as the pakṣa, and assert that whatever has origination is unreal. What does not obtain in the beginning, and does not, again, in the end does not exist. Supply the analogy of rucaka and such items.

This verse suggests a formal syllogistic presentation (pañcāvayava-vākya) of the logic that goes to prove that the world is unreal.

Pakṣa is the subject of a syllogism (rendered sometimes also as the ‘minor term’). While inferring the presence of fire on the hill, the hill is taken as the pakṣa. “Upamā” is loosely used in lieu of udāharaṇa.

Now the pentad of formal argumentative statements would run thus:

1. Assertion to be proved: Elemental things (such as ākāśa) are born in time, and are hence unreal.2. Grounds: That it was present neither at the beginning nor at the end.3. Reasoning and Analogy: Whatever was not at the beginning nor at the end would be unreal - as is the case with rucaka etc.4. Application: Similar to the above, entities such as ākāśa etc are not present at the beginning and are not present at the end.5. Conclusion: Therefore, like rucaka etc, entities such as ākāśa are also unreal.

What has already been demonstrated is that things like rucaka are unreal. There is also the famous logical assertion that what is not present at the beginning and not present at the end is not present at the present moment too.

Therefore, it is only that which is present in all the three phases - viz. the beginning, the middle, and the end - alone qualifies to be called real; and whatever is otherwise is unreal.

Not at the beginning, not at the end
कनके रुचकादि न पूर्वमभूत्चरमं च न विद्यत इत्यनृतम्।
अधुनापि तथैव समस्तमिदंजनिमद्वियदादि भवेदनृतम् ॥ 134 ॥

kanake rucakādi na pūrvamabhūccaramaṁ ca na vidyata ityanṛtam ।
adhunā'pi tathaiva samastamidaṁ janimadviyadādi bhavedanṛtam ॥ 134 ॥
Entities like rucaka were not present earlier, and will not be present finally; hence they are unreal. Even so, all this - viz. ākāśa etc - have a point of birth, and therefore, would be unreal even now.

In the example provided, in the beginning was just gold which was later turned into the ornament called rucaka. Upon dissolution, rucaka ceases to exist, and returns into just gold.Thus, all golden ornaments such as rucaka have a beginning in time and an ending in time. They have not been here all the time. The conclusion is that they are not permanent entities.

Whatever is impermanent is unreal. And therefore, rucaka etc are unreal.

Not essentially different is the fate of the world. The world has had a commencement, and would necessarily have an ending. The world has therefore not existed for all past, and would not exist for all future. In fact, it does not exist at present too, for whatever has origination in time is impermanent. The impermanent world, it follows, is an unreal entity.

Nothing born in addition
कनकादिषु यद्युपजातमभूत्रुचकप्रमुखं पृथगेव ततः।
अधिकं परिमाणममीषु कुतोन भवेदिति वाच्यमवश्यमिदम् ॥ 135 ॥

kanakādiṣu yadyupajātamabhūdrucakapramukhaṁ pṛthageva tataḥ ।
adhikaṁ parimāṇamamīṣu kuto na bhavediti vācyamavaśyamidam ॥ 135 ॥
If it is asserted that entities like rucaka come to be born out of gold separately and additionally, then this question will have to be answered necessarily: how come there has been no increase in quantity in these?

This question is posed to the Vaiśeṣika-s. According to them the cause and effect are fundamentally different: the effect is born anew. This is in contrast to the position of the Vedāntin-s viz. the cause and the effect are essentially the same. While Vedāntin-s are called Satkāryavādin-s, Vaiśeṣika-s are called Asatkāryavādin-s.

When rucaka is made of gold, Vedāntins say, gold has just assumed another form viz. rucaka; but Vaiśeṣika-s would say rucaka, rather different from gold, is born anew. On the same analogy, the world is born, and will remain different from its causes, they argue.

The question posed by the Vedāntin against the position of the Vaiśeṣika-s is - how come the quantity or weight of the rucaka not get altered as against that of gold? A new substance should have new features. Why should there be a constancy of weight? The law of conservation of mass is adhered to even when there is this palpable change - from gold as such, to the ornament (rucaka or any other). If a totally new entity has come into being, why does it not betray features totally different from those of the original stuff (or the material cause) out of which it was designed?

The Vaiśeṣika has no answer for this - a question he necessarily had to answer if he stuck to his guns.

Cause abides; effect elides
कनकप्रभृतेर्व्यतिरिक्तमतोरुचकादि न विद्यत एव, कुतः।
पृथगग्रहणात् कनकप्रभृतेर्इति कारणमेव सदन्यदसत् ॥ 136 ॥

kanakaprabhṛtervyatiriktamato rucakādi na vidyata eva kutaḥ ।
pṛthagagrahaṇātkanakaprabhṛteriti kāraṇameva sadanyadasat ॥ 136 ॥
Therefore, there is no rucaka and the like, else than gold and the like. Why? There is no rucaka and the like, perceived else than the gold and the like. And hence it is the cause alone that is real; else is unreal.

There are no two separate entities called rucaka and gold. One cannot isolate or separate one from the other. There is no rucaka seen as else than or differently located at, than gold. Things are different when they are seen distinctly. What is rucaka is nothing but gold while the reverse is not the case.

Gold abides and not rucaka; this is because gold is the cause and rucaka, the effect. The cause abides, not the effect. What abides is real and not what does not abide is unreal. Kāraṇa abides while kārya does not. Kāraṇa is real, kārya is not.

Cause and effect: how different
ननु नाम पृथग्विकृतिः प्रकृते-रथरूपमथापि च कार्यमतः।
कथमव्यतिरिक्ततयावगमःप्रकृतेर्विकृतेरिति वाच्यमिदम् ॥ 137 ॥

nanu nāma pṛthagvikṛteḥ prakṛteratha rūpamathāpi ca kāryamataḥ ।
kathamavyatiriktatayā'vagamaḥ prakṛtervikṛteriti vācyamidam ॥ 137 ॥
[Objection:] Is not vikṛti rather different from Prakṛti, as too are the forms [of vikṛti], and as too its function? How can at all Prakṛti be apprehended as distinct from vikṛti? This question needs to be answered].

The form of rucaka and the form of gold are different. The function of rucaka is different from that of just gold. This being the case vikṛti and Prakṛti are different. And how can the two be apprehended as the same? How can vikṛti be grasped as the same is Prakṛti?

This question stands in need of an answer. Rucaka, the pot and the cloth stand in one category. Gold, mud and thread stand in another. The name, form and function of the rucaka (and other similar items) are different from those of gold (and other similar items).

Two things are the same when their names are the same - normally speaking. Things are different when they look different. If their functions are not the same, how can the two be equated? The commonality of one or the other of these leads to the things perceived as the same. Even a slight difference can make them look or be different. When there are wide differences felt, how can there be an equation of those items? There is no chance, then, that vikṛti be seen as essentially different from prakṛti.

This is the objection of the Vaiśeṣika.

Cause and effect : how non-different
इह वीरणतन्तुसुवर्णमृदःकटशाटकहारघटाकृतयः।
उपलब्धृजनैरुपलब्धमतोन भिदास्ति ततः प्रकृतेर्विकृतेः ॥ 138 ॥

iha vīraṇatantusuvarṇamṛdaḥ kaṭaśāṭakahāraghaṭākṛtayaḥ ।
upalabdhṛjanairūpalabdhamato na bhidā'sti tataḥ prakṛtervikṛteḥ ॥ 138 ॥
[Reply:] The [mat] grass, thread, gold and mud are ones that assume the shapes respectively of the mat, the cloth, the garland and pot. People capable of perception are a witness to this, and so there is no difference whatsoever of vikṛti from Prakṛti.

Those who have eyes to see will have noticed this. Even as the worker is weaving a mat, the grass has already begun to look like the mat. So with threads getting to appear like the cloth. The same applies to gold and mud.

Those who are capable of perception can easily behold this with their very eyes. The transition from the state of Prakṛti to that of vikṛti is so evident, after all. As all this is a matter of even direct perception, whence no one can assert a vikṛti as essentially different from Prakṛti.

Difference in title: difference in stuff
विकृतिर्यदि नास्ति पृथक् प्रकृतेर्न घटेत भिदाप्यभिधाप्रभृतेः।
इति धीर्विफला तव येन जनैर्विविदे नयनेन मृदाद्यभिधा ॥ 139 ॥

vikṛtiryadi nāsti pṛthak prakṛterna ghaṭeta bhidā'pyabhidhāprabhṛteḥ ।
iti dhīrviphalā tava yena janairvivide nayanena mṛdādyabhidā ॥ 139 ॥
Your thinking viz. “If vikṛti is not different from Prakṛti, then their names etc. could not get different” is futile - for, people have noticed with their very eyes that the pot (and such) are no different from mud (and such).

The vikṛti-s acquire different titles etc. Every different vikṛti will have a different name/form/ function. Our very eyes tell us, however, that the pot is no different from mud.

Ocular evidence itself vouches for the non-difference between the two.

Same or different? : actor and role
ननु रूपमथो ननु कार्यमथोअभिधापि नटस्य पृथग्विदिता।
न पृथक्त्वमुपैति नटः किमितिप्रतिवाच्यमवश्यमिदं कुशलैः ॥ 140 ॥

nanu rūpamatho api kāryamatho abhidhā'pi naṭasya pṛthag viditā ।
na pṛthaktvamupaiti naṭaḥ kimiti prativācyamavaśyamidaṁ kuśalaiḥ ॥ 140 ॥
The form, function, and even the title of the role that the actor enacts would all be different from the actor’s own; how come, yet the actor is not construed as different from the role he plays? Logicians, the intelligent, must provide an answer to this.

The actor is different, and the role(s) he dons is/are different. The two differ in respect of their names, their appearances, and their functions. The two ought to have then been perceived as different. On the contrary, even the lay know that they are identical.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-s have earned a fame as the most intelligent. So they need to respond to this question.

No birth - for either: the existent or the non-existent
असतो न कथञ्चन जन्म भवेत्तदसत्त्वत एव खपुष्पमिव।
न सतोऽस्ति भवः पुरतोऽपि भवात्यत आत्मवदेव सदिष्टमिति ॥ 141 ॥

asato na kathañcana janma bhavettadasattvata eva khapuṣpamiva ।
na sato'sti bhavaḥ puruto'pi bhavādyata ātmavadeva sadiṣṭamiti ॥ 141 ॥
What is asat, non-existent, can never be born; like the sky flower - for the very reason of its being asat. As to Sat, existent, there can be no birth of it whatsoever as it has already been there: like the ātman, Sat is acceded to.

There are things that are physical impossibilities. The sky-flower is an example. We all know what is sky, and what is flower, but none has encountered a “sky-flower”. For, it has never existed. It is a perfect example of something that is asat, nonexistent.

In contrast is the ātman, the exemplary example of what is Sat, the existent. As it has always been there, there is no question of it being born, for it has all along been present even before this enquiry began. Sat has always existed; Sat exists always.

Thus, what is asat can never take birth; and what is sat can also never take birth - the first for the reason that it can never at all exist; and the second for the reason that it has never ceased to exist at all.

The Sāṅkhyan viewpoint
कपिलासुरिपञ्चशिखादिमतंपरिगृह्य वदेद्यदि कश्चिदिदम्।
न कदाचन जन्म वदामि सतःप्रवदामि तु यच्छृणु तत्त्वमपि ॥ 142 ॥

kapilāsurapañcaśikhādimataṁ parigṛhya vadedyadi kaścididam ।
na kadā cana janma vadāmi sataḥ pravadāmi tu yacchṛṇu tattvamapi ॥ 142 ॥
Accepting the stand of Kapila, Āsuri and Pañcaśikha, someone may say this: I would never speak of the birth of what is sat. Listen, rather, to what I am to explain.

The school of thought represented by Kapila, Āsuri and Pañcaśikha is what is known as Sāṅkhya. The Sāṅkhyan-s are Satkāryavādin-s - those who say that kārya, effect, was already present, sat, (“kāryaṁ sat”) in the kāraṇa, cause.

The Sāṅkhyan would never say, therefore, that what was takes birth. The stand taken by the Sāṅkhyan is clarified in the next verse.

The undifferentiated becoming qualified
प्रकृतावविशिष्टतया यदभूत्अधुना तु तदेव विशेषयुतम्।
निरवद्यमिदं प्रतिभाति ममप्रवदात्र विरोधमवैषि यदि ॥ 143 ॥

prakṛtāvaviśiṣṭatayā yadabhūdadhunā tu tadeva viśeṣayutam ।
niravadyamidaṁ pratibhāti mama pravadātra virodhamavaiṣi yadi ॥ 143 ॥
What was in Prakṛti as undifferentiated has now been endowed with differentiations. And this [position] looks flawless to me. Do tell if you can spot any contradiction here.

What was in Prakṛti unexpressed has now gotten expressed in the vikṛti; Prakṛti is kāraṇa and vikṛti is kārya. The mud is the Prakṛti and the pot is the vikṛti. The pot lay dormant in the mud even earlier. Only, its features and attributes had no manifestation. When the pot is actually made out of mud, what originally was potentially has now become manifest.

The unexpressed attributes (in the mud) have now become manifest features (in the pot). Nothing, so then, that was not already has come to be anew. What was merely latent has now become patent.

This approach inspires the confidence of the Sāṅkhyan, and so, looking forward almost to an acceptance by the Vedāntin, he asks him whether he finds anything contradictory in what he is saying.

Did a non-existent attribute come to be?
सदयुज्यत येन गुणेन पुराप्रकृतौ स इहास्ति न वेति वद।
यदि विद्यत एव पुरा प्रकृतौअधुनापि विशेषयुतत्वमसत् ॥ 144 ॥

sadayujyata yena guṇena purā prakṛtau sa ihāsti na veti vada ।
yadi vidyata eva purā prakṛtāvadhunā'pi viśeṣayutatvamasat ॥ 144 ॥
Tell me whether the attribute which came to be united with Sat, the effect, was already present in Prakṛti or not. Were it to have already been there in the Prakṛti, it becomes improper to claim that the Prakṛti came to be endowed with it anew.

The issue here is one of attributes. If, again, the attribute was already present in the Prakṛti, it becomes improper to claim now that the Prakṛti came to be endowed with these attributes. Either way the Sāṅkhyan position seems problematic.

Birth implies death
यदि नास्ति पुरा स गुणः प्रकृता-वसदुद्भवनं भवतोऽभिमतम्।
जननेन च सत्त्वमुपात्तवतो जनिमत्त्वत एव विनष्टिरपि ॥ 145 ॥

yadi nāsti purā sa guṇaḥ prakṛtāvasadudbhavanaṁ bhavato'bhimatam ।
jananena ca sattvamupāttavato janimattvata eva vinaṣṭirapi ॥ 145 ॥
Were it the case that the attribute was not there in Prakṛti earlier, it will be tantamount to saying that something has arisen that was not. You will then have accepted the coming into being via birth, you will also be constrained to accept the destruction of something that has had a birth.

The converse of the argument presented in the previous verse has been taken up here. As per Satkāryavāda, the kārya was already in the kāraṇa, which amounts to saying that nothing new, in fact, comes into being. And the inverse of it follows too: viz. that what is is never destroyed.

If you say the attributes that were not there in the kāraṇa have now come to be with the kārya, it is an acceptance of what was not earlier. And this goes squarely counter to the celebrated Satkāryavāda of the Sāṅkhyan-s. And the moment the Sāṅkhyan concedes to the coming into existence via birth of anything, he is constrained to accept its death and dissolution too subsequently.

All this can lead the Sāṅkhyan in confusion as his concessions land him in the very Vaiśeṣika domain he wanted to counter. Thus, the irony is that the Vaiśeṣika is the sworn enemy of Sāṅkhya, and the Sāṅkhyan will have to curse himself for landing in the Vaiśeṣikan net unwittingly.

Sāṅkhya playing into the hands of the Vaiśeṣika?
भवतोऽभिमतं परिहर्तुमिदंन कथञ्चन शक्यत इत्यमुतः।
कणभक्षमतेन समत्वमिदंभवतोऽभिमतं शनकैरगमत् ॥ 146 ॥

bhavato'bhimataṁ parihartumidaṁ na kathañcana śakyata ityamutaḥ ।
kaṇabhakṣamatena samatvamidaṁ bhavato'bhimataṁ śanakairagamat ॥ 146 ॥
On grounds that it is in no way possible to avoid what has now been deemed by you, your school has slowly come to be on par with the school of Kaṇāda.

The moment the Sāṅkhyan makes a concession - in regard to the acceptance of new characteristics in the effect which did not obtain in the cause, he has unknowingly drifted to the school of Kaṇāda viz. the Vaiśeṣika, which itself he opposes vehemently. This is how a careless thinker sometimes plays into the hands of the opposite camp.

Already refuted: Birthing anew
असतो भवनं नशनं च सतःकणभोजिमतं विदितं कविभिः।
उपपत्तिविरुद्धतया सुभृशंतदभाणि मयापि विरुद्धतया ॥ 147 ॥

asato bhavanaṁ naśanaṁ ca sataḥ kaṇabhojimataṁ viditaṁ kavibhiḥ ।
upapattiviruddhatayā subhṛśaṁ tadabhāṇi mayā'pi viruddhatayā ॥ 147 ॥
It is known to scholars that the ideas - of the non-existent coming into being, and of the existent one getting destroyed - are those of Kaṇāda. It was declared by me as extremely contradictory to sense, as it is highly antithetical to logic.

Things coming into being anew, and the existent things getting destroyed completely - these notions are the hallmarks of the Vaiśeṣika theory of Kaṇāda.

That it does not at all stand to logic has been amply demonstrated by me already.

Summoning the evidence of the Gītā
प्रतिषिद्धमिदं कणभोजिमतंहरिणापि समस्तगुरोर्गुरुणा।
वचनेन तु नासत इत्यमुनाब्रुवता च पृथातनयाय हितम् ॥ 148 ॥

pratiṣiddhamidaṁ kaṇabhojimataṁ hariṇā'pi samastagurorguruṇā ।
vacanena tu nāsata ityamunā bruvatā ca pṛthātanayāya hitam ॥ 148 ॥
This stand of Kaṇāda has been refuted by Lord Kṛṣṇa Himself - the Guru of all guru-s - while he spoke to Arjuna for the sake of his well-being, through the words "nāsato etc".

Lord Kṛṣṇa is the greatest of all guru-s; as they say "Kṛṣṇaṁ vande jagadgurum". The BG constitutes the teaching He imparted to Arjuna on the battlefield bearing in mind the well-being of Arjuna.

In BG 2.26, He says what is not cannot be born, and what is cannot get destroyed - nāsato vidyate bhāvo, nābhāvo vidyate sataḥ. This constitutes an open refutation of the Asatkāryavāda propounded by Vaiśeṣika-s.

Therefore, nothing more needs to be stated regarding the invalidity and unreliability of the Vaiśeṣika school of thought.

Be and not-be - both at once?!
असतश्च सतश्च न जन्म भवेत्इति पूर्वमवाद्युपपत्तियुतम्।
सदसच्च न जायत एव कुतोन हि वस्तु तथाविधमस्ति यतः ॥ 149 ॥

asataśca sataśca na janma bhavediti pūrvamavādyupapattiyutam ।
sadasacca na jāyata eva kuto nahi vastu tathāvidhamasti yataḥ ॥ 149 ॥
It was demonstrated earlier that neither asat could take birth, nor could Sat. (Q) Why would something which is at once Sat as well as asat not take birth? (A) But there is no such thing which is of that type.

It was presented logically that what is indeed asat cannot be born. Equally what is Sat cannot be born either. For, the former could never exist at all; and the latter has already come into being.

A Jaina objection is now raised in the third pāda, and is answered in the fourth. The objection is : why cannot something which is simultaneously Sat and asat be born?

Jaina-s ask this question because as per their Syādvāda (also called Anekāntavāda), a thing can simultaneously have seven modes of being, and accordingly, a thing can be at once sat and asat.

But this question is answered empirically by saying that such a thing has indeed never existed, as exhibits simultaneously the twin opposite properties of being Sat and asat. None has encountered such a thing.

This answers the objection raised by the Jaina-s.

Neither is; nor is not
सदसत्त्वमतीत्य मनःप्रभृतेर्न कथञ्चन वृत्तिरिहास्ति यतः।
तत एव मनःप्रमुखस्य भवोन भवेदिति सर्वसुवेद्यमिति ॥ 150 ॥

sadasattvamatītya manaḥprabhṛterna kathañcana vṛttirihāsti yataḥ ।
tata eva manaḥpramukhasya bhavo na bhavediti sarvasuvedyamiti ॥ 150 ॥
The mind and other entities can in no manner exist transcending the two modes viz. being Sat and being asat. By the same logic as the above is grasped, it is discernible by all that the mind and other entities can in no wise come into being either.

The first half of the verse speaks of vṛtti (existence) and the second half of the possibility of the birth (bhava) of the same - of entities viz. those commencing with the mind.

The essential argument is if the existence of mind etc. is just impossible, so is the very birth impossible; for, what is spoken of here is not just mind as such, but mind as transcending both sattva and asattva. In other words, mind etc have to be either Sat or asat, and there can be no third mode whatsoever.

As what is stated in the latter half of the verse is based on the self-same grounds as what is in the former half, it is referred to as being easily comprehensible to all.

Go by the Vedic dictum
यदि नाम कथञ्चिदमुष्य भवःसदसत्त्वमपेक्ष्य भविष्यति वः।
अमृषात्वममुष्य तथापि न तुश्रुतिरस्य मृषात्वमुवाच यतः ॥ 151 ॥

yadi nāma kathañcidamuṣya bhavaḥ sadasattvamapekṣya bhaviṣyati vaḥ ।
amṛṣātvamamuṣya tathā'pi na tu śrutirasya mṛṣātvamuvāca yataḥ ॥ 151 ॥
Even if the birth of this world is accepted by you - whether as issuing from sat or as issuing from asat - yet the non-falseness of the world cannot be possible; for the Veda speaks of the falseness of this.

There are numerous Vedic statements e.g in CU and MU, that assert that everything is Brahman. This can be taken as implying that all else from Brahman is unreal.

What ensues once the status of mind is settled
मनसोऽनृततैवमवादि यतःतत एव हि तस्य मृषा चरितम्।
यत एव मृषा मनसश्चरितंतत एव पुरोदितसिद्धिरभूत् ॥ 152 ॥

manaso'nṛtataivamavādi yatastata eva hi tasya mṛṣā caritam ।
yata eva mṛṣā manasaścaritaṁ tata eva puroditasiddhirabhūt ॥ 152 ॥
On the very grounds that manas has been shown to be unreal, its function too is but unreal. For the very reason that the functions of the mind are unreal, what was asserted earlier also becomes established.

Once it is shown that the mind is unreal, it has only to follow that the mental functions are unreal too. The states called the wakeful, the dream, and deep sleep - are all mental functions. It now ensues that the three states are unreal too. Further to this conclusion, it is only a step ahead that shows that if there are no three, there can be no fourth. Therefore, to call Ātman as the Fourth is also only relatively done.

“Slitherings” of a sculpted snake
यदपेक्ष्य तु नाम भवेत्त्रितयंपरमात्मपदस्य तुरीयमिति।
तदसत्यमसत्यगुणस्तु यतःपरिनिर्मितसर्पविसर्पणवत् ॥ 153 ॥

yadapekṣya tu nāma bhavettritayaṁ paramātmapadasya turīyamiti ।
tadasatyamasatyaguṇastu yataḥ parinirmitasarpavisarpaṇavat ॥ 153 ॥
Depending upon the very trinity that the appellation Turīya attaches to Paramātman - that [very trinity] is itself an unreal characteristic - much like the crooked movements of but a sculpted serpent.

The title Turīya, the Fourth, owes its very origin to the acceptance of the three states of mind. It has been shown now that the Trinity of states is but unreal. "The Fourth" - which depends even for its title on the trinity - then, is unreal, too.

The three referred to are functions of the mind, which has also been shown to be unreal. It is on account of this false imputation that even Paramātman has been labelled, relatively, that is, as Turīya, the Fourth.

Therefore, it is only relatively that Paramātman is stamped “Turīya”. The functions of the mind, being all unreal, are only comparable to the movements of a serpent. Only, the serpent here is not the real serpent we come across in the world; it is but an imaginary serpent. All this amounts to saying that the various mental states are akin to the movements of an imaginary serpent, which is to say, just unreal.

If items 1 to 3 are unreal, the one labelled 4 (on the basis of 1 to 3) can only be unreal. If Paramātman is labelled as the Fourth, it does well only in the realm of imagination.

Concurrence of Veda and logic
निखिलस्य मनःप्रमुखस्य यतोवितथत्वमवादि पुरा तु मया।
श्रुतियुक्तिबलेन ततोऽद्वयकंपरमक्षरमेव सदन्यदसत् ॥ 154 ॥

nikhilasya manaḥpramukhasya yato vitathatvamavādi purā tu mayā ।
śrutiyuktibalena tato'dvayakaṁ paramakṣarameva sadanyadasat ॥ 154 ॥
The unreality of the entire set [viz.] manas and other entities - has already been expounded by me on the basis of śruti and yukti (the Veda-s and logic). And therefore, it is only the imperishable and secondless Paramātman that is real; all else is unreal.

On twin grounds of the pertinent Vedic passages and argumentation, I have demonstrated that manas and other entities are all unreal. And therefore it follows that there is only one real entity viz. the secondless and indestructible Paramātman. All else is unreal.

Nothing prior/later; within/without
तदपूर्वमबाह्यमनन्तरकंन च किञ्चन तस्य भवत्यपरम्।
इति वेदवचोऽनुशशास यतोवितथं परतोऽन्यदतः प्रगतम् ॥ 155 ॥

yadapūrvamabāhyamanantarakaṁ na ca kiñcana tasya bhavatyaparam ।
iti vedavaconu'śaśāsa yato vitayaṁ parato'nyadataḥ pragatam ॥ 155 ॥
“Nothing precedes it; nothing lies outside of it; nothing exists in its interior; and there is nothing that succeeds it” : so do the Vedic passages give the ruling. It becomes very evident then, that all else that is different from Brahman is unreal.

The idea stated in the verse is a paraphrase of a passage in BU (2.5.19). Paramātman has nothing that precedes it. What precedes can alone be causal to what succeeds. Hence Paramātman is causeless. What succeeds something is its effect. Hence Paramātman is the cause of nothing else. Thus, Paramātman is neither a cause nor an effect.

On similar lines, there is nothing exterior to nor interior to Paramātman. In other words, Brahman is impartite, spatially as well as temporally. All these ideas have their sanction from the Veda-s. So then, whatever is noted as else than Paramātman, just is not. Paramātman is the only real; all else is unreal.

Solid salt: solid consciousness
प्रतिषिध्य यतो बहिरन्तरपि स्वविलक्षणमात्मन उक्तवती।
अवबोधघनत्वमतोऽन्यदसत्लवणैकरसत्वनिदर्शनतः ॥ 156 ॥

pratiṣidhya yato bahirantarapi svavilakṣaṇamātmana uktavatī ।
avavodhaghanatvamato'nyadasallavaṇaikarasatvanidarśanataḥ ॥ 156 ॥
The Veda negates all else from Paramātman whether outside or inside. Presenting the example of Saindhava-lavaṇa (sea salt) for the prajñāna-ghana (dense consciousness) that Paramātman is; and hence all else is unreal.

The passage referred to is BU 4.5.13. The mass of salt is all salt through and through, and nothing else at all. So is Paramātman pure consciousness all through, utterly uncontaminated. There is nothing within and nothing without.

Dense awareness: that’s you
लवणैकरसत्वसमं फणितंस्वविलक्षणवस्तुनिषेधनतः।
अवबोधघनं परमात्मपदंत्वमवेहि तदस्मि सदाहमिति ॥ 157 ॥

lavaṇaikarasatvasamaṁ bhaṇitaṁ svavilakṣaṇavastuniṣedhanataḥ ।
avabodhaghanaṁ paramātmapadaṁ tvamavehi tadasmi sadā'hamiti ॥ 157 ॥
Warding off all else which is unlike itself, the equality with the taste of salt alone has been stated [in the Veda-s], indicating that the abode of Paramātman is solid knowledge; and know that you are the same all the time.

The Upaniṣad has given the analogy of solid salt. No other taste can interfere therein, whether on its surface or in its interior. In other words, this example precludes the possibility of any entity else than the one that is being spoken of.

It is Paramātman that is being spoken of, and there is little else than it. Comparable to the solid salt is the solid consciousness - unbroken, uninterrupted, unalloyed, uncorrupted.

The disciple is finally asked to identify himself with this: He is that very thing always.

Sat: sans all attributes
अणु नो न च तद्विपरीतगुणंन च ह्रस्वमतो न च दीर्घमपि।
प्रतिषिद्धसमस्तविशेषणकंपरमक्षरमात्मतयाश्रय भोः ॥ 158 ॥

aṇu no na ca tadviparītaguṇo na ca hnasvamato na ca dīrghamapi ।
pratiṣiddhasamastaviśeṣaṇakaṁ paramakṣaramātmatayā''śraya bhoḥ ॥ 158 ॥
Paramātman is not atomic, nor has the opposite characteristic. It is not short, and not long either. Smallness and bigness, shortness and longness are all attributes that describe entities. Paramātman precludes the possibilities of all such qualifications.

The preceptor instructs the pupil to resort to that Paramātman - who is afar from the various qualifications such as short and long - as his very self. Paramātman never ceases to be.

Extraneous features : mistaken as Atmic
असुबुद्धिशरीरगुणान् षडिमान्अविवेकिजनैर्दृशिधर्मतया।
प्रतिपन्नतमान् प्रविहाय शनैःदृशिमात्रमवेहि सदाहमिति ॥ 159 ॥

asubuddhiśarīraguṇān ṣaḍimānavivekijanairdṛśidharmatayā ।
pratipannatamān pravihāya śanairdṛśimātramavehi sadā'hamiti ॥ 159 ॥
Forsaking by and by these six - which are the properties of prāṇa, buddhi, and śarīra (breath, mind and body), and which have been clasped the most by the indiscriminate as the features of their very seership - know yourself as the Sole Seer.

There are six items that condition the body, the mind, and the vital air. Old age and death trouble the body; sorrow and delusion eclipse the mind; hunger and thirst pester the vital air. These are known as ṣaḍūrmi-s ("six waves"). Take shelter, O disciple, under that imperishable Paramātman, which is prohibitive of all attributes. Ironically, men lacking the power of discrimination take these very six as the features of their very self : they cling to these fondly! Eschew these gradually, and realise that you are the Seer and Seer alone! – says the preceptor.

Slough is no self
अहिनिर्ल्वयनीमहिरात्मतयाजगृहे परिमोक्षणतस्तु पुरा।
परिमुच्य तु तामुरगः स्वबिले न पुनः समवेक्षत आत्मतया ॥ 160 ॥

ahinirlvayanīmahirātmatayā jagṛhe parimokṣaṇatastu purā ।
parimucya tu tāmuragaḥ svabile na punaḥ samavekṣata ātmatayā ॥ 160 ॥
Prior to casting it off, the serpent deemed the slough to be its own self. Shedding it, the serpent in its hole never again looks upon the same as its self.

This is a paraphrase of a passage from the BU. The snake considers the skin as no different from itself – prior, that is, to casting it off as the slough. Once cast off, the snake repairs to its hollow, never again looking upon the shed slough as its very self.

The realised jīva ceases to identify itself with all things exterior to its own pure Self, the pure Seer.

As the slough is, so the body is
अविवेकत आत्मतया विदितंकुशरीरमिदं भवताप्यहिवत्।
अहिवत्त्यज देहमिमं त्वमपिप्रतिपद्य चिदात्मकमात्मतया ॥ 161 ॥

avivekata ātmatayā viditaṁ kuśarīramidaṁ bhavatā'pyahivat ।
ahivattyaja dehamimaṁ tvamapi pratipadya cidātmakamātmatayā ॥ 161 ॥
You too, O disciple, should abandon, like the serpent, this wretched body, presumed, quite as the serpent does [wrt its slough], as your self out of indiscrimination [after] accepting that your self as consciousness essentially.

The snake thinks of its skin as its very self. Even so you are thinking of your detestable body as your self. This is on account of indiscretion, after all. The snake casts off its slough and so should you too shed this body. Prior to this however, you must realise that you are cid-ātmaka, of the very nature of consciousness.

The body-self (mis)identification is the most common ailment, and the most difficult one to overcome.

Analogy: Sun has no day/night
रजनीदिवसौ न रवेर्भवतःप्रभया सततं युत एष यतः।
अविवेकविवेकगुणावपि तौभवतो न रवेरिव नित्यदृशेः ॥ 162 ॥

rajanīdivasau na raverbhavataḥ prabhayā satataṁ yata eṣa yutaḥ ।
avivekavivekaguṇāvapi te bhavato na raveriva nityadṛśeḥ ॥ 162 ॥
Night and day are not experienced by the Sun, for, he is endowed with glow all the time. Even so indiscrimination and discrimination are not features of the self, who is the seer ever - as with the Sun.

Mortals on the earth experience day and night. The Sun himself does not experience them. He is ever aglow. Exactly parallel is the case with the self. The presence and the absence of discrimination are features that cannot characterize the true self. The self is the seer ever.

No bond, no release
परिशुद्धविबुद्धविमुक्तदृशेःअविवेकविवेकविवर्जनतः।
मम बन्धविमोक्षगुणौ भवतोन कदाचिदपीत्यवगच्छ भृशम् ॥ 163 ॥

pariśuddhavibuddhavimuktadṛśeravivekavivekavivarjanataḥ ।
mama bandhavimokṣaguṇau bhavato na kadācidapītyavagaccha bhṛśam ॥ 163 ॥
Understand this very well (with regard to your very self): these features - called bondage and liberation - would never be there for me; for I am bereft of discrimination and indiscrimination as I am the free Seer who is pure and awake.

Had there been the possibilities - of the presence and absence of discrimination and indiscrimination - there could be the possibilities of bondage and liberation. As the former does not exist, the latter cannot either; the two are never indeed possible. Contrary to the supposition raised earlier, I am pure and awake, and am a liberated Seer.

No actions; none else
न मम ग्रहणोज्झनमस्ति मयान परेण दृशेरिति निश्चिनु भोः।
न हि कस्यचिदात्मनि कर्म भवेत् न हि कश्चिदिहास्ति मदन्य इति ॥ 164 ॥

na mama grahaṇojjhanamasti mayā na pareṇa dṛśeriti niścinu bhoḥ ।
nahi kasyacidātmani karma bhavenna ca kaścidihāsti madanya iti ॥ 164 ॥
Ascertain this for yourself: a Seer that I am, there is no question of acceptance or rejection by me, or [even] by others. There can be no action in the self of any, and there is none else than myself either too. There can be no action whatsoever in oneself: the ātman is above all action. There is no question of even give and take - the very simplest of actions. And in such acts requiring the participation of more than one person no actions spring.

The reason for this is that there is no action in one's own self, and there is, indeed, none else than myself.

Sole witness
अहमस्मि चरस्थिरदेहधियांचरितस्य सदेक्षक एक इति।
न भवेदत एव मदन्य इतित्वमवेहि सुमेध इदं सुदृढम् ॥ 165 ॥

ahamasmi carasthiradehadhiyāṁ caritasya sadekṣaka eka iti ।
na bhavedata eva madanya iti tvamavehi sumedha idaṁ sudṛḍham ॥ 165 ॥
I am the sole Seer ever for the actions of things movable and immovable, and for the mind and the intellect. And for this very reason, there is none else than me - know this firmly, O intelligent student!

The world we see abounds in beings living and non-living, beings that move about and ones that stand still. They are full of actions. At the same time, mind and body too have their own continuous actions. I am merely a witness, a continuous witness to all of them.

And for this reason, know well, O disciple, that there is none but yourself.

Self like the sky : impervious
गगने विमले जलदादिमलेसति वाऽसति वा न भिदास्ति यथा।
त्वयि सर्वगते परिशुद्धदृशोन भिदास्ति तथा द्वयभेदकृता ॥ 166 ॥

gagane vimale jaladādimateḥ sati vā'sati vā na bhidā'sti yathā ।
tvayi sarvagate pariśuddhadṛśau na bhidā'sti tathā dvayabhedakṛtā ॥ 166 ॥
There is no difference whatsoever in the sky - when it is pure or is sullied by clouds. Even so, a pure witness that you are who is omnipresent, there can be no difference issuing on account of the dualities. We see the sky afflicted by clouds and sometimes unaffected by them. But do all these make any difference for the sky at all? Even so, the ātman is present everywhere. And so there can be no difference instituted by the dualities of life. I am the seer, pure and simple. The sky is ever pure, clouds or no clouds. Even the clouds cannot actually "stick" to the sky. The sky never becomes sullied; so with the self.
River out of mirage?
अनृतं द्वयमित्यवदाम पुराव्यवहारमपेक्ष्य तु गीतमिदम्।
अनृतेन न सत्यमुपैति युजांन मरीचिजलेन नदी ह्रदिनी ॥ 167 ॥

anṛtaṁ dvayamityavadāma purā vyavahāramapekṣya tu gītamidam ।
anṛtena na satyamupaiti yujāṁ na marīcijalena nadī hradinī ॥ 167 ॥
As we stated earlier, duality is unreal. Even this was stated against the background of vyavahāra. Truth cannot unite with what is untrue. A river cannot have pools of water filled with the waters of the mirage. Even if it was stated earlier that duality is unreal it was stated keeping in mind the vyavahāra or worldly transaction. The true and the untrue do not commingle in reality. And therefore, what was stated earlier must be taken in its proper spirit.

A special analogy is provided in the last quarter of the verse. We see water in mirages. Howsoever vast the mirage may be, it cannot get flooded into a river that will have pools created thereby. Even so, what indeed does not exist cannot be treated on par with what does, and any talk about some interaction between the two is also not essentially real.

Avasthā-s: imaginary
बहुनाभिहितेन किमु क्रियतेशृणु सङ्ग्रहमत्र वदामि तव।
त्वयि जागरितप्रभृति त्रितयंपरिकल्पितमित्यसदेव सदा ॥ 168 ॥

bahunā'bhihitena kimu kriyate śṛṇu saṅgrahamatra vadāmi tava ।
tvayi jāgaritaprabhṛtitritayaṁ parikalpitamityasadeva sadā ॥ 168 ॥
What would be accomplished by speaking much? Listen to the summary, which I state now. The trinity comprising the wakeful etc is only imaginary, hence ever unreal.

The master has dwelt too long on rather simple issues, and prolixity is not a great merit as it does not accomplish much. So, the gist of the whole precept may be given in brief: the three states viz. the wakeful, the dream and the deep sleep, are just not there in you. Imaginary as they are, they are just unreal.

Nothing to perceive; nothing to perceive with
परिकल्पितमित्यसदित्युदितंमन इत्यभिशब्दितमागमतः।
उपपत्तिभिरेव च सिद्धमतोभवतोऽन्यदशेषमभूतमिति ॥ 169 ॥

parikalpitamityasadityuditaṁ mana ityabhiśabditamāgamataḥ ।
upapattibhireva ca siddhamato bhavato'nyadaśeṣamabhūtamiti ॥ 169 ॥
On grounds of being born, the world has been spoken of as unreal; the same is [the fate] of the mind too - going by the Vedic passages. Even on grounds of logic, it is now established that all else than yourself is unreal.

Whatever is born is unreal. The world and the mind are unreal. This has been established on both grounds - of Vedic passages indicating the same, and sheer logic.

Else than yourself, O disciple, all is nought.

All denied; except the denier
यदबाह्यमनन्तरमेकरसंयदकार्यमकारणमद्वयकम्।
यदशेषविशेषविहीनतरंदृशिरूपमनन्तमृतं तदसि ॥ 170 ॥

yadabāhyamanantaramekarasaṁ yadakāryamakāraṇamadvayakam ।
yadaśeṣaviśeṣavihīnataraṁ dṛśirūpamanantamṛtaṁ tadasi ॥ 170 ॥
You are an expression of the Seer - that which has nothing outside of it, and nothing inside; that which is of the nature of consciousness; that which has no cause, no effects; that which is secondless; that which is completely devoid of any characterization; and that which is infinite and just true.

All the ideas stated here have been argued earlier. The verse is only a summary of the various features. Paramātman is what cannot be partitioned; what cannot involve in any action; serving therefore as neither the cause of something, or appearing as the effect of something either. It is infinite, and secondless. Its only characterization is that it cannot be characterized. That is of the nature of the witness and that you are, O disciple.

Nothing more to know
इयदेव मयोपनिषत्सु पदंपरमं विदितं न ततोऽस्त्यधिकम्।
इति पिप्पलभक्ष्य इवाभ्यवदत्अवशिष्टमतिं विनिवारयितुम् ॥ 171 ॥

iyadeva mayopaniṣatsu padaṁ paramaṁ viditaṁ na tato'styadhikam ।
iti pippalabhakṣa ivābhyavadaddhyavaśiṣṭamatiṁ vinivārayitum ॥ 171 ॥
This is what I have gathered from the Upaniṣad-s about the Supreme Paramātman; and beyond which there is little more to know either. So did he say as did sage Pippalāda tell his disciples, in order to dispel any notion that something more remains to be known.

The words of Pippalāda appear in PU (6.7). The emphasis is on "there is nothing more to gather". This was categorically stated in order to dispel any possible feeling of much more remaining to be taught or learnt.

Cross the sea with the boat of knowledge
इतरोऽपि गुरुं प्रणिपत्य जगौभगवन्निति तारितवानसि माम्।
अवबोधतरेण समुद्रमिमंमृतिजन्मजलं सुखदुःखझषम् ॥ 172 ॥

itaro'pi guruṁ praṇipatya jagau bhagavanniti tāritavānasi mām ।
avabodhatareṇa samudramimaṁ mṛtijanmajalaṁ sukhaduḥkhajhaṣam ॥ 172 ॥
The other too prostrated before the preceptor, and said: "Revered sir, you have enabled me to cross this ocean - which has death and birth for its waters, and joys and sorrows for its fish - by means of the boat called knowledge.

In this verse, the disciple expresses his gratitude to the master. He does it respectfully, bowing down to him first. His speech is reminiscent of the Upaniṣadic statements. You have helped me cross this ocean of existence, revered Sir, he says. The ocean is this very saṁsāra, the endless cycle of births and deaths, and visitations of joys and sorrows.

There is a beautiful metaphor employed here. Saṁsāra is the ocean. Births and deaths constitute the waters of the ocean. Joys and sorrows are the fish there. And the boat that is used here to cross the ocean is one of knowledge.

The gist is that it is only through knowledge that saṁsāra can be crossed.

Fulfilment attained
अधुनास्मि सुनिर्वृत आत्मरतिःकृतकृत्य उपेक्षक एकमनाः।
प्रहसन् विषयान् मृगतोयसमान्विचरामि महीं भवता सहितः ॥ 173 ॥

adhunā'smi sunirvṛta ātmaratiḥ kṛtakṛtya upekṣaka ekamanāḥ ।
prahasanviṣayānmṛgatoyasamānvicarāmi mahīṁ bhavatā sahitaḥ ॥ 173 ॥
Now I am supremely satisfied: I delight in my very self. I have attained fulfillment. I have grown indifferent. My mind is singular now. I am laughing at sensual objects which are only like but a mirage. And I can now roam about the earth along with you.

The sense of reaching the goal and end of life has dawned upon the disciple. He is utterly contented and delights now in his very self. He has accomplished what he ought to have in life. He is now indifferent to the happenings in the world. He is now focused.

Even more importantly he is able to spurn the sensual objects. And this is nothing he has forced upon himself, for he has just realised that those objects are akin to mirage, ever drawing attention and even attractive, but never indeed assuaging the thirst.

He is as free as the master himself, and he now feels free and adequate to move about in the world in the company of his master.

Service as gratitude
तव दास्यमहं भृशमामारणात्प्रतिपद्य शरीरधृतिं भगवन्।
करवाणि मया शकनीयमिदंतव कर्तुमतोऽन्यदशक्यमिति ॥ 174 ॥

tava dāsyamahaṁ bhṛśamāmaraṇātpratipadya śarīradhṛtiṁ bhagavan ।
karavāṇi mayā śakanīyamidaṁ tava kartumato'nyadaśakyamiti ॥ 174 ॥
Till my death, O revered sir, I will sustain this body and serve as your slave. This is all that I can do to you in return. Nothing more is possible for me to do.

Till my death do I serve you, said the disciple to the master, out of utter gratitude. The body lasts for some time - in proportion, that is, to the prārabdha-karman of the disciple.

The disciple has also the realisation that nothing more can indeed be done to pay his debt to his master.

Dialogue as in Veda-s
गुरुशिष्यकथाश्रवणेन मयाश्रुतिवच्छ्रुतिसारसमुद्धरणम्।
कृतमित्थमवैति य एतदसौन पतत्युदधौ मृतिजन्मजले ॥ 175 ॥

guruśiṣyakathāśravraṇena mayā śrutivacchrutisārasamuddharaṇam ।
kṛtamitthamavaiti ya etadasau na patatyudadhau mṛtijanmajale ॥ 175 ॥
Listening to the conversations between the masters and the disciples in the Upaniṣad-s, I have similarly composed Śruti-Sāra-Samuddharaṇam. Whosoever understands this, will not fall into the ocean that has death and birth as its waters.

The author says here that he has modelled his work after the Upaniṣadic dialogues. The title of the text itself is indicative of this. It draws the very essence of the Veda-s.

The phalaśruti of the work is also stated here. Whosoever comprehends this will cross the ocean of saṁsāra. He will not fall into the ocean of births and deaths which constitute the very waters of the ocean.

The Upaniṣad-s also speak of the "non-return" into the saṁsāric cycle of whosoever has crossed the ocean of saṁsāra.

Who should read this, who not
भगवद्भिरिदं गुरुभक्तियुतैःपठितव्यमपाठ्यमतोऽन्यजनैः।
गुरुभक्तिमतः प्रतिभाति यतोगुरुणोक्तमतोऽन्यजनो न पठेत् ॥ 176 ॥

bhagavadbhiridaṁ gurubhaktiyutaiḥ paṭhitavyamapāṭhyamato'nyajanaiḥ ।
gurubhaktimataḥ pratibhāti yato guruṇoktamato'nyarato na paṭhet ॥ 176 ॥
It is only the fortunate ones endowed with devotion to the master that should study this; it should not be read by those who are otherwise. It is only to the ones devoted to the master that the utterances of the guru become clear. Hence it is that those who are elsewise than this should not read this.

The verse cautions that those who have no devotion to the master are best advised to refrain from studying the book – the reason being : it is to those who are devoted to the master, that the ideas here become clear. Reading without bhakti in the guru does not yield much benefit.

This kind of caution is given towards the end of many texts including the BG.

The proper adhikārin
निगमोऽपि च यस्य इतिप्रभृतिःगुरुभक्तिमतः कथितं गुरुणा।
प्रतिभाति महात्मन इत्यवदत्पठितव्यमतो गुरुभक्तियुतैः ॥ 177 ॥

nigamo'pi ca yasya itiprabhṛtirgurubhaktimataḥ kathitaṁ guruṇā ।
pratibhāti mahātmana ityavadatpaṭhitavyamato gurubhaktiyutaiḥ ॥ 177 ॥
In the Vedic passage starting with yasya, it has been stated that it is to the great person who is devoted to the master, that the ideas become clear. And therefore, those devoted to the guru must read this.

The reference here is to the passage from ŚU (6.23) where it states clearly that the ideas stated by the master occur clearly [only] to that mahātman, great self, who is greatly devoted to the Lord, and devoted equally to the guru.

The same idea is taken up in the verse and has been paraphrased with almost the same words.

Inner darkness dispelled : gratitude lifelong
येषां धीसूर्यदीप्त्या प्रतिहतमगमन्नाशमेकान्ततो मेध्वान्तं स्वान्तस्य हेतुर्जननमरणसन्तानदोलाधिरूढेः।
येषां पादौ प्रपन्नाः श्रुतिशमविनयैर्भूषिताः शिष्यसङ्घाः सद्योमुक्ताः स्थितास्तान् यतिवरमहितान् यावदायुर्नमामि ॥ 178 ॥

yeṣāṁ dhīsūryadīptyā pratihatimagamannāśamekāntato me
dhvāntaṁ svāntasya heturjananamaraṇasantānadolādhirūḍheḥ ।
yeṣāṁ pādau prapannāḥ śrutiśamavinayairbhūṣitāḥ śiṣyasaṅghāḥ
sadyo muktau sthitāstānyatiparamahitānyāvadāyurnamāmi ॥ 178 ॥
I bow down all my life to the great personages who are honoured by the great sages. It is with the glow of the sun called their intellect that the darkness of my mind - which is the cause for my ascending the swing of the series of births and deaths - was obstructed and finally destroyed. It is their feet resorting to which hosts of disciples came to be adorned with knowledge, tranquility and humility and became even sadyo-mukta-s, instantly liberated.

The serial births and deaths constitute the swing. The swing has dual endings – of alternating births and deaths endlessly. It is my mental darkness, my ignorance, that caused me to get to this peculiar swing, the continuous movement of which I could not stop. The one thing that stopped the swing, and ultimately destroyed it once and for all, is the intense illumination from the Sun called my master’s intellect. My master is revered by many great sannyāsin-s. It is not merely the intellect of my master that is extraordinary. Even the feet of my master are great. Numerous groups of disciples took shelter under the same, and became embellished with knowledge, peace and humility; and they even attained immediate release from saṁsāra.

I bow down as long as I live to such a master of mine.

Salutation to the Cosmic Lord
भूःपादौ यस्य नाभिर्वियदसुरनिलश्चन्द्रसूर्यौ च नेत्रेकर्णावाशाः शिरो द्यौर्मुखमपि दहनो यस्य वास्तेयमब्धिः।
अन्तःस्थं यस्य विश्वं सुरनरखगगोभोगिगन्धर्वदैत्यैःचित्रं रंरम्यते तं त्रिभुवनवपुषं विष्णुमीशं नमामि ॥ 179 ॥

bhūḥ pādau yasya nābhirviyadasuranilaścandrasūryau ca netre
karṇāvāśā śiro dyaurmukhamapi dahano yasya vāstavyamabdhiḥ ।
antaḥsthaṁ yasya viśvaṁ suranarakhagagobhogigandharvadaityai-
ścitraṁ raṁramyate taṁ tribhuvanavapuṣaṁ viṣṇumīśaṁ namāmi ॥ 179 ॥
I bow down to Lord Viṣṇu. The three worlds are His body. The earth constitutes His feet. The sky constitutes His navel. The air constitutes His breath. The Sun and the Moon constitute His eyes. The directions constitute His ears. The heavens constitute His head. Fire constitutes His face. The ocean constitutes His bowels. The world is all within Him. And he sports in a wondrous manner along with gods and men, birds and cows, serpents and gandharva-s and demons.

The verse occurs also as a dhyāna-śloka at the commencement of Śrī Viṣṇu Sahasranāman. The verse contains an extraordinary, cosmic, metaphor.